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Abstract 
The experience of simultaneously positive and negative orientations toward a person, goal, task, idea, 
and such appears to be quite common in organizations, but it is poorly understood. We develop a 
multilevel perspective on ambivalence in organizations that demonstrates how this phenomenon is 
integral to certain cognitive and emotional processes and important outcomes. Specifically, we discuss 
the organizational triggers of ambivalence and the cognitive and emotional mechanisms through which 
ambivalence diffuses between the individual and collective levels of analysis. We offer an integrative 
framework of major responses to highly intense ambivalence (avoidance, domination, compromise, 
and holism) that is applicable to actors at the individual and collective levels. The positive and negative 
outcomes associated with each response, and the conditions under which each is most effective, are 
explored. Although ambivalence is uncomfortable for actors, it has the potential to foster growth in the 
actor as well as highly adaptive and effective behavior. 
Introduction 
Consider the popular imagery of the leader in an organization. For some of the many below him 
in the hierarchy, he is secure, knowing, decisive, powerful, dynamic, threatening, driving, and 
altogether remote, acting in clear or obscure ways to affect the future of the organization he 
leads. At eye level, he is more often seen as filled with troubled doubts as he tries to deal with 
the ambivalences and contradictions of his status. And if his feet are made of a substance more 
solid than clay, it is because on his climb to the top and with the aid of those who help hold him 
there, he has learned to still the doubts, to live with the ambivalences, and to cope with the 
contradictions of his position. (Merton 1976, p. 73) 
As this quotation from Robert Merton suggests, ambivalence appears to be fairly common in 
organizational settings. Actors are buffeted by complex and dynamic work environments; play multiple 
and, at times, contradictory roles; and confront multifaceted issues, goals, and the like (Wang and Pratt 
2008). However, as the quote goes on to suggest, actors are often able to “live with the ambivalence” 
and “cope with the contradictions.” The quote thus begs the question, how do actors accomplish this 
difficult feat—how do they respond to the vexing mixed feelings and thoughts that characterize 
ambivalence and somehow move forward with a clear focus and coherent action? 
Research in organizational studies is turning increasingly to this and related questions. Indeed, since 
the turn of this century, organizational scholars have linked ambivalence and ambivalent relationships 
with organizations to resistance to change (Piderit 2000), the propensity to commit corporate crimes 
(Vadera and Pratt 2013), and to an increase in escapist behaviors among service personnel (Pratt and 
Doucet 2000). However, during this same period, other research has linked cognitive and/or emotional 
ambivalence to better chief executive offier (CEO) decision making (Plambeck and Weber 2009), 
heightened creativity (Fong 2006), increased receptivity to alternatives resulting in improved judgment 
accuracy (Rees et al. 2013), and stronger organizational commitment (Pratt and Rosa 2003). 
Unfortunately, such research remains scattered, with few systematic attempts to either link or 
systematize the dizzying number of reactions to ambivalence in organizations. 
Specifically, a review of extant research on this topic suggests that we know much more about specific 
types of responses (e.g., nonconscious responses; Horney 1945) than the conceptual relationship 
between responses. Although we know at a general level that individuals might embrace or deny their 
ambivalence (Pratt and Pradies 2011)1—and that specific responses range widely from paralysis to 
vacillation to strong and concerted action (see Pratt and Doucet 2000, Weigert and Franks 1989)—we 
know relatively little about how to compare these various responses. As such, research may be 
overlooking key response types. As we explain in greater detail below, we argue that some types of 
responses have received a lot of attention (e.g., avoidance), whereas others have been largely ignored 
(e.g., holism). In addition, we know that various types of responses exist, but we know relatively little 
about the effectiveness of these responses. We define effectiveness as the degree to which a response 
reduces the intensity of ambivalence—given the situation—by dealing with the source directly and/or 
the symptoms that result. Finally, efforts to organize various responses to ambivalence have tended to 
focus on a single level of analysis—namely, the individual (cf. Pradies and Pratt 2010). In short, the field 
is lacking a comprehensive typology for building more systematic research on responses to 
ambivalence across levels of analysis in organizational settings. 
Prior to building a theoretical framework that provides clarity to such responses, it is important to 
grasp where ambivalence comes from—that is, the key triggers of ambivalence in organizations—and 
how the experience of ambivalence tends to diffuse across levels of analysis. Organizational research 
suggests that ambivalence is experienced and acted upon by both individuals (Fong 2006, Pratt 2000) 
and collectives (Peters et al. 2011, Pradies and Pratt 2010, Weick 2004). What might trigger 
ambivalence within the individual level, the collective level, or across the levels, and through which 
social psychological mechanisms might ambivalence diffuse across levels? Establishing a model linking 
the upstream processes that connect triggers of ambivalence to the experience itself at both the 
individual and collective levels of analysis will set the stage for examining what actors then do with the 
ambivalence experienced. 
In sum, our paper seeks to provide an organizing framework of responses to ambivalence: a framework 
that is applicable to both the individual and collective levels of analysis and that clarifies the conditions 
under which each response is relatively more effective. To build a foundation for these issues, we first 
discuss what ambivalence is. We then discuss the organizational triggers of ambivalence and how 
ambivalence at one level of analysis may diffuse to the other level. We then provide an in-depth 
exploration of individual and collective responses to ambivalence. The result is an integrative multilevel 
framework of ambivalence in organizations that indicates how this phenomenon is central to certain 
cognitive/emotional processes and important outcomes. We specifically suggest that avoidance, 
domination, compromise, and holism are the major, more or less distinct, responses to ambivalence. 
We also discuss the conditions under which each response is most effective and the positive and 
negative outcomes of each response. We conclude by exploring implications for future research. 
What Is Ambivalence? 
Ambivalence literally refers to the experience of two (ambi) opposing forces (valences) and is derived 
from the Latin ambo, or “both,” and valere, which means “to be strong” (Meyerson and Scully 1995). 
Although there have been some differences in how ambivalence has been defined (see Conner and 
Sparks 2002 for a review), there remains a high degree of convergence across definitions in 
psychological research. Specifically, we define ambivalence as simultaneously positive and negative 
orientations toward an object. “Orientation” refers to the actor’s alignment or position with regard to 
the object, where a positive orientation means attraction or a pull toward it and a negative orientation 
means repulsion or a push away from it. Ambivalence includes cognition (“I think about X”) and/or 
emotion (“I feel about X”); ambivalence occurs when cognitions clash, emotions clash, or cognitions 
and emotions clash. Thus, ambivalence is often described as having “mixed feelings,” being “torn 
between conflicting impulses,” and being “pulled in different directions.” 
Four important points regarding our definition of ambivalence should be clarified. First, following 
research on the psychodynamic roots of ambivalence (Freud 1950/1920, Horney 1945, Sincoff 1990), 
individuals may not be conscious of their ambivalence. However, even if nonconscious, ambivalence 
may nonetheless affect individuals (cf. Meyerson and Scully 1995). Second, we follow the lead of 
others (e.g., Horney 1945) and focus on substantive (or, as we describe later, high intensity) rather 
than superficial (low intensity) ambivalence, as the latter (1) is likely to be ignored, (2) has little impact 
on behavior, and by extension (3) is of relatively little concern to management. Third, although some 
conceptualizations of ambivalence also include a behavioral component, we focus exclusively on 
ambivalence as a cognitive-emotional construct.2 Ambivalence, as it was originally coined by Bleuler in 
the early 1900s, focused only on cognition and emotion (Sincoff 1990). In addition, abundant research 
on the attitude–behavior relationship (see Sheeran 2002 for a review) indicates that various factors 
may dampen the link between the two, such as situational constraints and impression management 
concerns. Thus, we regard behavioral tendencies and behavior itself as probabilistic outcomes of 
ambivalence rather than as part of its definition. Finally, with some notable exceptions, the literature 
tends to view ambivalence as more or less dysfunctional for individuals (e.g., Bowlby 1982, Horney 
1945, Merton 1976). However, we will argue that ambivalence can be functional, dysfunctional, or 
perhaps—not ironically—both. 
Table 1 contrasts our definition of ambivalence with definitions of related constructs in the 
organizational literature—cognitive dissonance, emotional dissonance, hypocrisy, ambiguity, and 
equivocality. As the table suggests, the seminal differences between ambivalence and these other 
constructs are that ambivalence involves an individual’s oppositional orientations toward an object 
rather than mere uncertainty or inconsistency, and it involves cognition and/or emotion but not 
behavior. 
Table 1 Construct Definitions and Relationships to Ambivalence at the Individual Level 
Construct Definition 
Ambivalence Simultaneously oppositional positive and negative orientations toward an object. 
Ambivalence includes cognition (“I think about X”) and/or emotion (“I feel about X”). 
Cognitive 
dissonance 
“When a person has two beliefs or items of knowledge that are not consistent with each 
other” (Kantola et al. 1984, p. 417). There is conceptual overlap between dissonance and 
ambivalence (Baek 2010), but this definition suggests that dissonance arises when there is 
inconsistency between thoughts (e.g., I want to hire candidate A, but I also want to hire 
candidate B), whereas ambivalence requires opposite orientations, which is a more extreme 
contrast than inconsistency, toward a single object (e.g., I want to hire candidate A and I 
want to not hire candidate A). Additionally, cognitive dissonance is exclusively cognitive, 
whereas ambivalence can be cognitive and/or affective. 
Emotional 
dissonance 
“The discrepancy between emotions felt and those required by the job role is commonly 
referred to as emotional dissonance” (Diestel and Schmidt 2011, p. 643). As with the 
distinction above regarding cognitive dissonance, ambivalence requires opposition and not 
simply discrepancy. Thus, a role may require one to smile when one does not feel like it 
(emotional dissonance), but this is different than simultaneously feeling happy and not 
happy (ambivalence). Moreover, the inconsistency in emotional dissonance is between a 
feeling and a behavior that one’s role demands. Ambivalence is not necessarily emotional 
and does not include a behavior. 
Hypocrisy “Clear inconsistency between word and deed” (Fassin and Buelens 2011, p. 587). Hypocrisy 
is a contradiction between a statement and action, which is generally perceived and labeled 
by an observer. Ambivalence involves cognition and/or emotion rather than behavior, 
although ambivalence may cause an actor to behave in ways that could be perceived by 
others as hypocritical. Thus, hypocrisy can be an outcome of ambivalence. 
Ambiguity “The degree of uncertainty inherent in perceptions of the environmental state” (Carson et 
al. 2006, p. 1059). Ambiguity is concerned with uncertainty or a lack of clarity, whereas 
ambivalence is the experience of two clear but opposing thoughts and/or feelings toward an 
object. 
Equivocality “The multiplicity of meaning conveyed by information about organizational activities” (Daft 
and Macintosh 1981, p. 211). Equivocality captures the potential for multiple meanings and 
interpretations of a message. If these meanings are oppositional, there is potential for the 
equivocality to trigger ambivalence. 
 
Collective Ambivalence 
Researchers such as Smith and Berg (1987), Weick (2004), Pradies and Pratt (2010), and Peters et al. 
(2011) have suggested the existence of ambivalence in collectives. For example, in referring to a 
network of medical specialists working to identify the West Nile Virus, Weick (2002, p. s13, emphasis 
added) notes that “[a]mbivalence can be a property of networks and distributed cognition, as well as a 
property of individuals.” However, beyond indicating the possibility that collective ambivalence can 
exist, little work has been done to formally define and differentiate collective-level ambivalence 
(cf. Pradies and Pratt 2010).3 
Ambivalence at the collective level aligns with our definition presented earlier: simultaneously positive 
and negative orientations toward an object, whereby ambivalence includes cognition (“we think 
about X”) and/or emotion (“we feel about X”) experienced by a collective. Also, just as ambivalence at 
the individual level can be said to be more or less intense and more or less conscious, so too can 
ambivalence at the collective level. Finally, mirroring what we did at the individual level, Table 
2 contrasts this definition with related constructs at the collective level—namely, duality, paradox, 
organizational hypocrisy, dialectics, and organizational ambidexterity. The major differences are that 
duality, paradox, and organizational hypocrisy refer to external conditions that when internalized by a 
collective may give rise to ambivalence, and that dialectics and organizational ambidexterity refer to 
means of managing tensions rather than to the actual experience of ambivalence. 
Table 2 Construct Definitions and Relationships to Ambivalence at the Collective Level 
Construct Definition 
Ambivalence Simultaneously oppositional positive and negative orientations toward an object. 
Ambivalence includes cognition (“we think about X”) and/or emotion (“we feel about X”). 
Duality “The twofold character of an object of study without separation…it retains the idea of 
two essential elements, but it views them as interdependent [complementary and 
contradictory], rather than separate and opposed” (Farjoun 2010, p. 203). Whereas 
ambivalence is internal to the actor, a duality exists external to the actor perceiving the 
duality. A duality may trigger ambivalence if the two essential elements produce opposite 
orientations. 
Paradox “ ‘Paradox’ denotes contradictory yet interrelated elements—elements that seem logical 
in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously” (Lewis 2000, p. 
760). Paradox refers to situations that are external to actors. A paradox may trigger 




Brunsson (1993) refers to organizational hypocrisy to describe occasions when an 
organization acts in contradiction to what it says. As with sociological ambivalence more 
generally, such a hypocritical “event” may trigger collective-level ambivalence if it is 
experienced by multiple members of the organization. However, organizational hypocrisy 
in and of itself does not denote how such hypocrisy is experienced—either as a univalent 
response (e.g., disillusionment, disgust) or an ambivalent response. 
Dialectics Tracy (2004) explains how dialectics is a tension management technique that enables 
organizational actors to not view tensions as tensions per se but, via reframing, as 
complementary. However, dialectics is more about managing tensions or even 
contradictions than the experience of these tensions. As such, dialectics is more akin to 
the response we labeled “holism” than to ambivalence. 
Organizational 
ambidexterity 
“[F]irms are ambidextrous—aligned and efficient in their management of today’s business 
demands while simultaneously adaptive to changes in the environment…. To be 
ambidextrous, organizations have to reconcile internal tensions and conflicting demands 
in their task environments” (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, p. 375). As with dialectics, 
organizational ambidexterity focuses on organizational actions to manage tension and 
conflicting demands, rather than the experience of ambivalence. 
 
Organizational Triggers and the Diffusion of Ambivalence 
What situational factors cue ambivalence at the individual and collective levels of analysis, and how 
does ambivalence experienced at the individual level spread to the collective level, and vice 
versa? Figure 1 summarizes the arguments to follow. The multilevel dynamism of the figure is modeled 
after the approach of Kozlowski et al. (2009) to organizational learning across multiple levels of 
analysis, along with research on specific social-psychological mechanisms through which cognition and 
emotion may spread in organizations. 
 
Figure 1 Organizational Ambivalence Across Levels 
Organizational Triggers of Ambivalence 
Sociologists have tended to view norms and roles as sources of ambivalence, whereas psychologists 
have tended to view individual differences and relationships as sources (Wang and Pratt 2008). 
Although psychological sources of ambivalence are relatively well understood, the contextual sources 
of ambivalence, particularly in organizations, “have often been elusive or highly contingent” (Plambeck 
and Weber 2010, p. 705). Given our interest in understanding how individuals and collectives respond 
to ambivalence, we focus on the most common potential organizational triggers of ambivalence. Each 
of the four major types of triggers discussed below can operate at the collective or individual level of 
analysis, as our examples will illustrate. It should be noted that these triggers, like any situational 
factor, are a matter of perception and are more or less amenable to framing by organizational leaders 
(Smircich and Morgan 1982). 
The major contextual roots of ambivalence appear to be complexity and dynamism in the environment 
and the organization itself (cf. Weigert and Franks 1989). Organizations typically face complex and 
dynamic environments, where the meaning of events is ambiguous or equivocal, the future is 
fundamentally uncertain, and the numerous and often conflicting demands of diverse stakeholders 
must be addressed. Such environments frequently foster the more proximal contextual root 
of oppositions, where a demand for A is juxtaposed with a demand for “not-A.” 
Oppositions appear to manifest in four major ways: (1) hybrid identities, contradictory goals, and role 
conflicts; (2) dualities; (3) multifaceted objects; and (4) temporal factors. 
Hybrid Identities, Contradictory Goals, and Role Conflicts 
According to Merton and Barber (1976, p. 6), “[I]ncompatible normative expectations of attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviors” are the essence of sociological ambivalence. Specifically, such oppositions may 
manifest in hybrid identities, contradictory goals, and role conflicts (Adler 2012, Albert and Whetten 
1985, Brunsson 1989, Katz and Kahn 1978, Pratt and Foreman 2000). To illustrate, at the collective 
level, Glynn (2000) shows how the Atlantic Symphony Orchestra played out its competing “artistry” 
and “utility” identities during a musicians’ strike—with the former identity focusing on normative 
claims of excellent music and the latter focusing on economic concerns for profit. At the individual 
level, Fong and Tiedens (2002) note the emotional ambivalence experienced by women in high-status 
positions. On one hand, attainment of professional goals produces positive affect; on the other hand, 
pressure to conform to gender stereotypes (that contradict normative behaviors in high-power roles) 
produces negative affect. 
Organizational Dualities 
Oppositional tendencies often manifest in the form of organizational dualities and related concepts 
such as paradoxes, dilemmas, double binds, oxymorons, and ironies (Clegg 2002, Hatch 1997, Smith 
and Lewis 2011, Tracy 2004). Dualities are particularly likely to provoke ambivalence because of their 
simultaneous injunction to do A and to do the opposite of A. Well-documented examples, particularly 
at the collective level, include continuity versus change, a global versus local focus, and competition 
versus cooperation. Although ostensibly opposites on a continuum, where more of one necessarily 
means less of the other, a dualities perspective views them as facets of a natural wholeness (Graetz 
and Smith 2008). That is, the dualistic facets are complementary even though each—as noted in Table 
2 regarding paradox—may “seem logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing 
simultaneously” (Lewis 2000, p. 760). However, dualities and related concepts may nonetheless trigger 
ambivalence toward a given action by fostering seemingly oppositional imperatives (e.g., competition 
versus cooperation). 
Perhaps the most common dualities faced by individuals involve memberships in various collectives, 
including the organization itself. Smith and Berg (1987) describe 12 membership dualities under the 
labels of “paradoxes of belonging” (e.g., maintaining individuality and maintaining commonality within 
a group), “paradoxes of engaging” (e.g., incorporating past experiences while breaking with past 
experiences), and “paradoxes of speaking” (e.g., accepting dependence on group members in order to 
act independently). Accordingly, even the most effective collectives are laced with many, at least tacit, 
dualities for the individual. Moreover, the more strongly that one dualistic quality is emphasized, the 
greater the countervailing need for the other (Erikson 1976, Smelser 1998). For instance, following 
Smith and Berg, a strong effort to identify with a group may spawn a counter-desire to establish one’s 
individuality. 
Multifaceted Objects 
Oppositions often manifest in multifaceted objects, such as policies and cultures at the collective level 
and jobs and relationships at the individual level (Merton 1976, Pratt 2001). Although an individual’s or 
collective’s stance toward particularly salient facets may exert a positive or negative “halo” 
(e.g., Feeley 2002) over other facets, it remains that the individual or collective is unlikely to have a 
common stance toward every facet, partly because positive and negative aspects tend to surface over 
time (Wilson and Hodges 1992). Specifically, the more familiar an actor is with an object, the richer the 
store of information and the greater the probability of having encountered the object’s multiple facets 
and imperfections. In short, as Brooks and Highhouse (2006, p. 105) put it, “Familiarity breeds 
ambivalence.” For example, research on personal relationships indicates that ambivalence typically 
characterizes even the most intimate of bonds; indeed, Thompson and Holmes (1996, p. 502) conclude 
that “a moderate level of ambivalence may actually indicate a balanced, realistic assessment of a 
partner.” Moving to organizational contexts, Oglensky (2008) concludes that even robust mentor–
protégé relationships are inherently ambivalent, and Kreiner and Ashforth’s (2004, p. 20) study 
suggested that ambivalent identification with the organization was “not a rare existential experience” 
among employees (see also Brief 1998, Ziegler et al. 2012). 
Temporal Factors 
Finally, oppositional tendencies are often introduced by various temporal factors (Hillcoat-Nallétamby 
and Phillips 2011, Pratt and Doucet 2000). As noted, organizational contexts are typically dynamic; 
indeed, Lewin (1951) argues that seemingly stable states are really temporary equilibria held in place 
by opposing forces. Dynamism may introduce change, inconsistencies, ambiguities, and lags in objects 
at the individual and collective levels of analysis such that, similar to multifaceted objects, they 
generate oppositions. An otherwise supportive manager may act in a surprisingly unsupportive 
manner, and an organization that strongly espouses integrity may succumb to temptation and act in a 
highly unethical way. Furthermore, the use of developmental feedback at the individual level and 
continuous improvement at the collective level necessitates that even under conditions of success, 
actors need to acknowledge both the pros and cons (e.g., “The project was a success, but we can do 
better next time”). And research on counterfactual thinking indicates that reflecting on “what could 
have been” (Roese 1997, as cited in Fong 2006, p. 1017) may introduce, for individuals and collectives 
alike, an oppositional stance into otherwise positive events (“it could have been better”) and negative 
events (“it could have been worse”). For example, Olympic silver medalists were found to 
be less happy with their achievement than bronze medalists because they “just missed the gold” 
(Medvec et al. 1995). 
It is evident, then, that the complexity and dynamism of organizational life engender a number of 
potential oppositions. Moreover, as indicated by the bidirectional arrow 1 in Figure 1, oppositions at 
one level of analysis may affect oppositions at the other. For example, prisons are charged with the 
somewhat oppositional goals of rehabilitating inmates and punishing inmates, which have “trickled 
down” (Tracy 2004, p. 124) to foster role conflict among individual correctional officers (e.g., “respect 
versus suspect”). Conversely, the individual-level paradoxes of belonging noted above (e.g., 
maintaining individuality, maintaining commonality within a group) may foster a collective that is riven 
with oppositions (e.g., we are one versus we are many; see Smith and Berg 1987). 
Because these oppositions are so commonplace in organizations, we suspect that ambivalence is a very 
common experience in organizations. Not surprisingly, as indicated by arrows 2 and 3 in Figure 1, 
oppositions at the collective or individual level of analysis tend to trigger the experience of 
ambivalence at the same level. For instance, Das and Teng (2000) report that strategic alliances involve 
certain dialectical tensions (e.g., cooperation versus competition, rigidity versus flexibility, short-term 
versus long-term orientation), which are likely to provoke ambivalence among top management teams 
(e.g., we should cooperate and not cooperate). And Ashforth et al. (2013) find that role conflict 
experienced by telemarketers is associated with ambivalence toward their occupation. Furthermore, 
following the theorizing of Kozlowski et al. (2009), cross-level effects from collective triggers to 
individuals’ experience of ambivalence are likely common (see arrow 4 in Figure 1). For 
instance, Piderit (2000) argues that the most prevalent reaction to organizational change—a temporal 
factor in our model—is employee ambivalence, as individuals simultaneously support and resist change 
efforts. Conversely, cross-level effects from individual-level triggers to collective ambivalence are likely 
to be more indirect. We argue in the following section that such cross-level effects are largely 
mediated by collective sensemaking and emotional processes (hence, we do not depict a cross-level 
arrow in Figure 1 from individual triggers to collective ambivalence). 
Diffusion of Ambivalence 
Whereas the previous section established the organizational triggers of ambivalence and their role in 
fostering individual and collective ambivalence (arrows 1–4 in Figure 1), this section focuses on the 
social-psychological mechanisms through which ambivalence at the individual level may spread to the 
collective level (i.e., bottom-up emergent effects; arrow 5) and ambivalence at the collective level may 
spread to the individual level (i.e., top-down cascade effects; also arrow 5). The upshot is a recursive 
loop where expressed ambivalence is likely to have a “ripple effect” (Barsade 2002, p. 644) such that “I 
think/feel” becomes “we think/feel,” and vice versa. 
Bottom-Up Emergent Effects 
Morgeson and Hofmann (1999, p. 257) note that “the investigation of constructs at the collective level 
could begin with an understanding of the interaction of organizational members.” To that 
end, Kozlowski and Klein (2000, p. 55) observe that “[a] phenomenon is emergent when it originates in 
the cognition, affect, behaviors, or other characteristics of individuals, is amplified by their interactions, 
and manifests as a higher-level, collective phenomenon.” Research on collective-level cognitions and 
emotions provides examples of collective cognitive phenomena such as team mental models (Klimoski 
and Mohammed 1994, Lim and Klein 2006), collective interpretations (Isabella 1990), and 
intersubjectivity (Ashforth et al. 2011, Wiley 1988) and collective emotional phenomena such as group 
affective tone (George 1996), emotional culture (Ashforth and Saks 2002), and group emotion (Barsade 
and Gibson 1998). These collective-level constructs are instructive for understanding the collective-
level nature of ambivalence and provide several pathways whereby ambivalence may emerge via 
individual interactions (Pradies and Pratt 2010). 
The sensemaking perspective (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Maitlis 2005, Weick 1995, Weick et al. 2005) 
is a useful mechanism for articulating the cognitive nature of the vertical links between individual and 
collective experiences of ambivalence (arrow 5 in the upward direction in Figure 1). According 
to Stigliani and Ravasi’s (2012, p. 1241) process model of collective sensemaking, individual 
sensemaking and cognitions become shared by the collective through “the interplay between 
conversational and material practices.” Stigliani and Ravasi found that design consultants alternated 
between working on their own and holding group meetings where they shared their ideas. Specifically, 
individuals noticed and bracketed information on their own, they articulated it to the group, and the 
group elaborated on it through explicit conversations (e.g., “storybuilding”), cognitive subprocesses 
(e.g., “building on each other’s ideas”), and material artifacts (e.g., “sketches”), which resulted in 
shared cognition among the collective. As an illustration regarding ambivalence, Gutierrez et al. (2010, 
p. 673) describe how revelations that the Catholic Church had covered up the sexual abuse of minors 
by priests fostered ambivalence toward the church among some individuals: “A few dozen grieving 
laity began gathering to discuss their reactions in a suburban church basement. Within five months, 
the group grew into a 20,000-member organization” called Voice of the Faithful; its motto is “Keep the 
faith, change the church.” 
Regarding the emotional processes through which ambivalence may emerge from the individual level 
(arrow 5 in the upward direction in Figure 1), one major pathway is via emotional contagion, defined as 
“a process in which a person or group influences the emotions or behavior of another person or group 
through the conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral attitudes” 
(Schoenewolf 1990, as cited in Barsade 2002, p. 646). With contagion, emotions can spread to a 
collective via nonconscious and conscious interactions such as synchronization (Neumann and Strack 
2000) and the social sharing of emotions (Peters and Kashima 2007). A second major pathway is 
suggested by Van Kleef’s (2008) emotions-as-social-information model, where emotional cues are 
“read” more indirectly via cognitive processing (“why does she feel that way?”). Similarly, individuals 
may engage in “emotional comparison” (Ashforth and Saks 2002, p. 350) with others to assess the 
meaning and appropriateness of their own arousal (“why do I feel this way?”; see, e.g., Bartel and 
Saavedra 2000). Rothman and Wiesenfeld (2007) confirm that ambivalent emotions can be read by 
others and thus may be suitable for contagion and social information effects. 
The upshot of collective sensemaking and the above emotional conduits is that individual ambivalence 
may foster collective ambivalence (arrow 5 in the upward direction in Figure 1). In the multilevel 
terminology of Kozlowski and Klein (2000, p. 16), these “forms of emergence” result in “composition” 
effects, that is, a convergence in the perspectives/experiences of individuals and the collective such 
that the ambivalence becomes shared.4 
Top-Down Cascade Effects 
In organizations, collective ambivalence is likely to spread from the collective to individuals, and 
particularly from leaders to followers, through both cognitive and emotional mechanisms. Because 
senior managers act on behalf of subunits and organizations, their experience of ambivalence 
implicates entire collectives (cf. Staw and Sutton 1993). Sensegiving enables managers to shape the 
way that individuals interpret and think about the context, which is perhaps the most important role 
that leaders play in times of change (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Maitlis and Lawrence 2007). 
Sensegiving is generally thought to be a deliberate and even strategic process of communicating 
meaning downward (e.g., framing, decoupling; see Fiss and Zajac 2006). There are two mechanisms 
through which managers may sow ambivalence downward: intentional and unintentional. First, 
following the notion of “strategic ambiguity,” managers may intentionally convey mixed or at least 
equivocal messages as a means of stimulating change by implicitly challenging the status quo in a 
relatively nonthreatening manner (Eisenberg 1984, Gioia et al. 2012). This literature argues that 
equivocality enables actors to perceive “the” message they personally favor, thereby producing 
ideographic rather than holographic ambivalence across actors with different preferences (see 
endnote 3 and, e.g., Sonenshein 2010). However, we will argue later in our discussion section that 
managers might intentionally sow ambivalence to provoke actors into thinking more dialectically and 
acting more wisely. Second, managers may sow ambivalence by unintentionally conveying mixed or at 
least equivocal messages. Even where managers attempt to buffer followers from the managers’ own 
experience of ambivalence by delivering clear and unequivocal messages (Smircich and Morgan 
1982, Smith et al. 2010), managers’ ambivalence may nonetheless “leak out” through various verbal 
and/or nonverbal cues. For instance, Larson and Tompkins (2005) found that senior managers of an 
aerospace company sent mixed messages about the desirability of a shift in corporate values from 
technical excellence to efficiency. Specifically, the managers continued to reward employees for 
technical excellence while propounding the overriding need for efficiency (at the expense of technical 
excellence), thereby sowing their ambivalence throughout the company and implicitly encouraging 
employee resistance to change. 
Collectives and, again, particularly leaders, may also spread ambivalence through emotional processes. 
Research clearly indicates that, whether intentionally or not, leaders serve to “model emotions” 
(Pescosolido 2002, p. 593), such that their expressed affect influences the affective experience of 
followers (e.g., Ashakanasy [sic] and Humphrey 2011, Erez et al. 2008). As with bottom-up emergence, 
the modeling may occur directly via emotional contagion or more indirectly through social information 
processing and comparison of emotional cues. In the above example of the aerospace company, Larson 
and Tompkins (2005, p. 13) note how management’s expressions of “collective pride” in the company’s 
technical excellence helped fuel employees’ ambivalence regarding the change from technical 
excellence to efficiency. 
In sum, as arrows 1–5 in Figure 1 indicate, there are four major organizational triggers of ambivalence 
affecting both the individual and collective levels of analysis. In turn, the individual’s experience of 
ambivalence may spread to the collective level via sensemaking and emotional processes (arrow 5 in 
the upward direction), and the collective’s experience of ambivalence may spread to the individual 
level via sensegiving and emotional processes (arrow 5 in the downward direction). Accordingly, the 
experience of ambivalence at one level is likely to be positively correlated with the experience of 
ambivalence at the other level. 
How Do Individuals and Collectives Respond to Ambivalence? 
Consistency theories such as cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) and balance theory (Heider 
1958) indicate that ambivalence tends to be aversive—that is, that the sense of being simultaneously 
attracted to and repulsed by an object is typically discomforting. Thus, Harrist (2006) finds the 
experience of ambivalence to be characterized by “disorientation,” described as a sense of 
disequilibrium, confusion, apprehension, and loss of control, where it feels wrong to have more than 
one orientation toward an object. 
We define a response as a conscious or nonconscious effort to reduce the intensity of ambivalence 
experienced, whether through addressing the underlying causes or the symptoms. A given response 
may involve cognition, affect, and/or behavior. Although our model of responses can be applied to 
cases of low- or high-intensity ambivalence, our discussion—as noted—focuses on the latter precisely 
because they are more problematic for the actor. Intensity refers to the extent to which the actor 
experiences opposing orientations as strong. Intensity is associated with issues that matter to the 
actor. The more intense ambivalence becomes, the more the actor will be motivated to take action to 
reduce the discomfort. 
Generally speaking, intense ambivalence is salient to the actor, where salience is the extent to which 
the actor is consciously aware of the opposing orientations. Intensity tends to trigger salience (the 
discomfort provokes awareness), and to a lesser extent, salience may reinforce intensity (awareness of 
a contradiction is itself disturbing). Most ambivalence research in psychology—and the goal in lab 
studies—focuses on at least moderately intense and highly salient ambivalence. However, it is possible 
to experience ambivalence that is intense yet not be aware of it. This is the primary focus of Freudian 
theories of defense mechanisms, where actors struggle nonconsciously to keep intense but socially 
undesirable thoughts and feelings from breaking into consciousness (Baumeister et al. 1998, Cramer 
2006). 
A Framework of Responses to Ambivalence 
Research in psychology and, to a lesser extent, sociology offers many responses to ambivalence 
(e.g., Coser 1966, Horney 1945, Katz and Glass 1979, Tracy 2004; see Pratt and Doucet 2000 for a 
review). However, what is sorely lacking is a clear conceptual framework for organizing these disparate 
responses to ambivalence and applying them systematically to organizational contexts. Such a 
framework will clarify how various responses are (or are not) related and will identify gaps in what has 
been studied and, accordingly, opportunities for future research. In this section, we offer an integrative 
framework to explain when and why certain responses are most likely to occur in organizations 
(see Figure 2). Prior work that was most instrumental to our framework includes Horney’s (1945) very 
basic typology of moving toward/away from/against the object of ambivalence (see also Pratt and 
Doucet 2000) and research on interpersonal conflict-handling styles (Blake and Mouton 1964, Rahim 
1985, Thomas 1992). 
 
Figure 2 Actor Responses to Ambivalence 
 
Figure 2 decomposes the response to ambivalence into a focus on the positive orientation (i.e., 
attraction) toward the object and a focus on the negative (i.e., repulsion) orientation, as reflected by 
the two axes. The axes are partitioned into “low” and “high” for pedagogical purposes, suggesting four 
more or less distinct responses to ambivalence. First, avoidance, similar to “moving away,” involves a 
low focus—that is, little emphasis—on each orientation. Second, compromise involves a moderate 
focus on each orientation. Third, domination, similar to “moving toward” and “moving against,” 
involves a high focus—that is, much emphasis—on one orientation and a low focus on the other; thus 
domination appears twice in the figure. Fourth, holism involves a high focus on each. 
Not surprisingly, collective-level ambivalence tends to motivate collective responses and individual-
level ambivalence tends to motivate individual responses (see arrows 6 and 7 in Figure 1). That is, 
responses are generally more likely to arise at the level where the ambivalence occurs, and such 
responses are generally more effective because they address the commensurate triggers. However, 
collective ambivalence may also motivate the cross-level effect of individual responses (arrow 8 
in Figure 1) if (1) collective responses are absent or ineffective, or (2) individuals prefer an idiosyncratic 
approach (e.g., engaging in avoidance while one’s peers engage in holism). Conversely, individual 
ambivalence on its own is unlikely to motivate a collective response precisely because the ambivalence 
is confined to the individual level. As noted, collective responses will be most likely to occur if 
individual ambivalence becomes diffused to the collective level. Finally, collective and individual 
responses likely interact as collective responses provide a context for any subsequent individual 
responses (e.g., an individual experiencing residual ambivalence may enact an additional response), 
and individual responses to collective ambivalence may facilitate, through social learning processes 
(Bandura 1977), a more collective response (bidirectional arrow 9 in Figure 1). 
Each of the four responses—avoidance, dominance, compromise, and holism—is considered below. It 
should be noted that the authors of the studies we cite did not use our terminology; we are inferring 
the existence of specific responses, as well as, at times, ambivalence itself, from the descriptions the 
authors provide. Our treatment of holism will be more detailed because it is less well understood and 
more complex. We consider the nature of each response to ambivalence and likely positive and 
negative outcomes for the individual and collective experiencing ambivalence. Additionally, we 
consider how other actors may view any behaviors that accompany the response. At first blush, it 
would appear that holism is the optimal response as it seems to signify a “win–win” approach in the 
sense that both orientations become fully integrated. However, in addition to arguing that there are 
both positive and negative outcomes associated with each response, we argue that each response is 
more effective under certain circumstances (cf. Rahim 1985). Furthermore, because conscious and 
nonconscious processes tend to be intertwined, it should be noted that the responses may be enacted 
consciously, nonconsciously, or both. 
To embed the discussion in organizational contexts, we focus on cases where the ambivalence is 
attributable to the organizational triggers discussed earlier. We assume that the triggers lack a ready 
pragmatic solution or that the actor opts out of such a solution (e.g., quits the job). Given the triggers, 
many issues are inherently difficult to resolve (e.g., awareness of an object’s multiple facets). We also 
assume, in view of the proximal contextual root of opposition that underlies the triggers discussed 
above and based on our reading of diverse examples of ambivalence in organizations, that a given 
trigger is amenable to a variety of responses. That is, specific triggers (e.g., dualities, multifaceted jobs) 
do not necessitate specific responses. That said, we will return to these assumptions in our discussion 
section. 
Avoidance 
Nature of the Response 
If intense ambivalence is by definition strong, how is it possible that an individual or collective can 
maintain a low focus on both the positive and negative orientations to the object? The answer, we 
contend, is through the use of defense mechanisms and coping mechanisms. Following Cramer (1998, 
p. 920; 2006), defense and coping mechanisms are means by which actors protect themselves from the 
“emotional consequences of adversity.” Defense mechanisms are nonconscious (in terms of awareness 
and effort) and unintentional, whereas coping mechanisms are conscious and intentional.5 Coping 
mechanisms focus on resolving the problem (what Lazarus and Folkman 1984 refer to as “problem-
focused coping”) and/or alleviating tension (“emotion-focused coping”). Because defense mechanisms 
and the emotion-focused coping mechanisms utilized in this cell of Figure 2 enable the actor to avoid 
directly dealing with the ambivalence and perhaps even acknowledging it, this cell is labeled 
“avoidance.” As such, avoidance is typically reactive rather than proactive. 
Perhaps the most commonly used avoidance defense mechanisms for warding off ambivalence are 
denial and splitting. Denial protects the actor from threat by actively but nonconsciously rejecting, 
reinterpreting, forgetting, or minimizing disagreeable information (Baumeister et al. 1998, Sincoff 
1992). Argyris (1990, p. 30) asserts that most organizational cultures actually facilitate and reward 
defensiveness because norms favor care for people within the organization over facing tough issues 
that could upset or offend them, such that “defense routines are protected and reinforced by the very 
people who prefer that they do not exist.” In splitting, the actor nonconsciously separates the positive 
and negative orientations so that opposition is not perceived. For example, Rowe et al. (2005) note 
that poor team performance may induce sports teams and their fans to be ambivalent about the team 
(“I love my team but I hate them for doing so poorly”). This ambivalence is often avoided by splitting 
the admired qualities of the team from the poor performance and attributing the latter to other 
causes, often the coach (cf. scapegoating; see Wexler 1993). The Boston Red Sox collapse at the end of 
the 2011 season, and the subsequent dismantling of the general management team, provides a good 
illustration of such dynamics (Brown 2011). 
Perhaps the most commonly used coping mechanisms in organizations for shielding the actor against 
the discomfort associated with marked ambivalence are suppression, escape or distraction, and 
emotional release. Because these mechanisms are commonly associated with all manner of stressors, 
our discussion will be brief. Suppression involves a conscious effort to dismiss anxiety-provoking 
thoughts about the issue in question. A manager facing ambivalence about his work role because of 
work–home conflicts (be at work versus be at home) may willfully disattend to the conflicts. Escape or 
distraction involves diverting one’s attention from the problematic issue. Finally, emotional release 
involves venting the aversive feelings arising from ambivalence. For example, Rosen (1988) describes 
how the members of an advertising agency vented the negative emotions associated with their 
ambivalence toward the firm by performing skits at the firm’s Christmas party; the skits lampooned 
senior management and the firm. 
Positive and Negative Outcomes 
Avoidance may appear to be a dysfunctional response to ambivalence in organizations. Because 
avoidance reduces the immediate tension associated with ambivalence, it may prevent the actor from 
even recognizing the ambivalence, thereby inhibiting learning and problem solving (Argyris 1993). Also, 
avoidance may prove futile in any event because unwelcome thoughts are not easily denied or 
suppressed (Wegner 1989), and focusing on unwelcome emotions through emotional release may only 
render them more salient (e.g., Brown et al. 2005). Thus, the defense mechanisms of denial and 
splitting have been labeled “immature” defenses (e.g., Andrews et al. 1993, p. 252), and emotion-
focused coping mechanisms have been found to predominate when an actor believes that a stressor 
must be endured rather than constructively managed (Folkman and Lazarus 1980). 
However, there appears to be a functional side to avoidance in organizations. Although avoidance does 
not address the root cause of the ambivalence, it may nonetheless be effective under two conditions. 
The first is where the actor has low discretion or agency and thus cannot forge a more integrative 
response, if warranted, as in compromise and holism. The second condition is where immediate action 
is not required or the opposing orientations are not actively in conflict. Keeping tensions at bay 
through avoidance may be all that is truly needed. For example, nurses who smoked were ambivalent 
about their responsibility for advising patients against smoking. When a patient’s need for such advice 
appeared low (e.g., the malady was unrelated to smoking), some nurses tended to avoid advising 
patients against smoking (Radsma and Bottorff 2009). Defense and coping mechanisms help reduce 
tension to a more tolerable level, enabling an actor to persevere more effectively. Indeed, it appears 
that most actors continue to perform effectively even though ambivalence is more the norm than the 
exception in various domains of life, presumably including organizations (Smelser 1998). Furthermore, 
defense and coping mechanisms may facilitate subsequent compromise and holism by reducing 
debilitating tension while preserving the ambivalent qualities. For instance, Schneider (2003, p. 
33) argues that splitting, by preventing “premature closure,” creates a “generative space” where actors 
have an opportunity to confront and work through the tension. 
Finally, because avoidance is largely signified by the absence of overt behaviors, other actors who are 
unaware of the issue prompting the ambivalence will have little reason to make attributions about the 
focal actor. When other actors are aware of the issue and regard it as important, avoidance—as the 
absence of action in the face of threat—is likely to prompt negative attributions (e.g., “that group is in 
denial”). 
Domination 
Nature of the Response 
Domination is a defense mechanism (i.e., a nonconscious process) and/or coping mechanism (i.e., a 
conscious process) through which actors bolster one orientation so that it overwhelms the other. 
Domination is thus characterized by a high focus on one orientation and a low focus on the other, and 
therefore it appears in two quadrants of Figure 2. Domination does not mean that all of the conflicting 
thoughts and feelings necessarily dissipate, only that the actor is able to choose one orientation—
positive or negative thoughts/feelings—over the other (Harrist 2006). Similar to avoidance, given the 
apparent emphasis on defense mechanisms over coping mechanisms, domination is typically reactive 
rather than proactive. 
Response amplification (cf. reaction formation) is the primary nonconscious form of domination, 
where one essentially exaggerates either the positive or negative orientation to the object so as to 
override or “dominate” the other orientation and thereby relieve ambivalence (Baumeister et al. 
1998, Bell and Esses 2002, Katz and Glass 1979). For example, ombudspersons handle the 
organizational ambivalence of (1) advocating for the best interests of employees who file complaints 
while (2) maintaining the status quo of organizational operations. Ombudspersons studied by Kolb 
(1987) tended to embrace one set of norms or the other, resolving the ambivalence by being either a 
“helping” ombudsperson or a “fact-finding” ombudsperson. It is important to note that domination via 
response amplification does not necessarily mean that the actor has permanently erased the opposite 
pole; rather, it may persist nonconsciously (Kets de Vries and Miller 1984). 
Response amplification may also be part of a nonconscious macro-oscillation that occurs over time, 
representing a shift from one domination cell in Figure 2 to the opposite domination cell, such that one 
experiences an entire paradigm shift. Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) provide an example. An artistic 
director and an administrative director of an opera company seemed to be inseparable, never differed 
in opinions, and consistently presented a united front in board meetings. This zealous relationship 
persisted for two years, until the administrative director violated the authority of the artistic director. 
Despite the interdependence of their roles, the two men quit interacting, and the artistic director 
vilified his colleague until the board fired him. The authors suggest that the relationship between the 
executives was not perfect prior to the falling out, implying some ambivalence toward the relationship. 
However, the negative feelings were forcefully held in abeyance, eventually gaining enough 
momentum to shift the ostensibly positive relationship to its opposite. The change from extremely 
positive to extremely negative represents a paradigm shift around the fulcrum of ambivalence. As the 
saying goes, there is often a thin line between love and hate. 
Intense ambivalence may also lead to conscious domination processes—that is, to coping mechanisms. 
Having acknowledged both orientations prior to making a decision, conscious domination appears to 
be a way of ignoring the importance of one orientation rather than ignoring its existence. Conscious 
domination can be as simple as actively deciding to commit to one extreme and dismiss the other, if 
only for the sake of relieving discomfort. For instance, Bridge and Baxter (1992) note the oppositional 
norms involved when one is both a supervisor and a friend toward the same individual, including 
impartiality versus favoritism, evaluation versus acceptance, and confidentiality versus openness. A 
supervisor may cope with the resulting ambivalence by privileging one role over the other. A 
supervisor interviewed by Zorn (1995, p. 136) stated, “What Sally and I would always do is I’d say ‘All 
right, I’m talking to you Sally-friend not Sally-supervisor.’ ” An example at the collective level of analysis 
is provided by Tracy’s (2004, p. 125) study of a correctional facility, where the norms “create ongoing 
ambivalence—between kindness and control, flexibility and rigidity, solidarity and autonomy.” As a 
result, the facility’s leaders encouraged officers to manage their ambivalence by downplaying some 
dimensions (e.g., kindness) and emphasizing others (e.g., control). 
Research indicates that ambivalence may prompt information processing that is biased toward 
whatever orientation is initially stronger or more salient (Clark et al. 2008, van Harreveld et al. 2009a). 
Thus, although domination is expedient, it may short-circuit detailed consideration of the foregone 
orientation. Indeed, research suggests that ambivalent attitudes are more susceptible than 
nonambivalent attitudes to a variety of (often specious) primes, including mood, recent cues about the 
object, and consensus information (i.e., what others think) (Bell and Esses 1997, Hass et al. 
1991, Hodson et al. 2001). It is as if the actor is looking for a way out, however specious the reasoning. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that conscious domination is very prone to rationalization because the 
actor may need a reassuring justification to bolster the choice (cf. neutralization theory; see Sykes and 
Matza 1957)—particularly if the actor is accountable to others (Tetlock 1985). Through rationalization, 
actors can convince themselves that one orientation is superior to the other or trivialize an orientation 
until the favored one can be enacted with greater ease (van Harreveld et al. 2009b). We acknowledge 
that domination is not the only process in Figure 2 where there may be a felt need to rationalize, but 
the need here appears particularly acute. In a study of “necessary evils” (i.e., tasks that cause harm to 
others to serve a greater purpose), Margolis and Molinsky (2008) observed the behaviors of 
ambivalent employees, such as police officers tasked with evicting tenants from their homes. Faced 
with the tension between what they considered as irreconcilable opposites—the obligation to do their 
job and the aversion toward causing hardship for those who could not pay their bills—some officers 
disengaged from the tenants, rationalizing the need for evictions (e.g., “Well, they [the evictees] put 
themselves in this situation. And what about the landlord…?”; p. 856). 
Positive and Negative Outcomes 
We argue that, in general, domination is most effective under one or more of the following conditions. 
The first is when the core of both the positive and negative orientations does not need to be preserved 
(e.g., having two equally desirable but mutually exclusive potential locations for a new plant, which 
creates ambivalence toward each alternative). In this case, decisive action is appropriate as it enables 
actors to relieve the intense ambivalence and align their thoughts and feelings with their behavior. The 
second condition is when the actor must choose between mutually exclusive orientations (e.g., hiring 
or not hiring a candidate for which there are mixed feelings)—and that is precisely when ambivalence 
becomes particularly intense (van Harreveld et al. 2009b). The third condition is when one orientation 
is actually counterproductive. For example, intense ambivalence could be caused by a need to 
complete a work-related project coupled with a fear of failure. Focusing on task completion while 
neutralizing the fear would provide an effective response to the ambivalence. That said, the rejected 
orientation may rear its head in unexpected ways (even when chased out of conscious awareness); 
as Lewis (2000, p. 763) notes, rejecting “one side of a polarity intensifies pressure from the other.” The 
final condition is when, as with avoidance, the actor has low discretion or agency and is thus less able 
to forge a more integrative response, if desired. 
Conversely, domination can be very dysfunctional in situations that require maintenance of both 
orientations. For instance, tension in the mission of a natural food cooperative required the 
simultaneous enactment of pragmatic business values and idealistic values that set the co-op apart 
from other grocers (Ashforth and Reingen 2014). To stay afloat, neither the pragmatic nor idealistic 
values could dominate over time. Domination would be a dysfunctional response that either destroys 
the co-op’s mission (if pragmatic values prevail) or bankrupts the co-op (if idealistic values prevail). 
Additionally, domination may be dysfunctional when the decision is biased toward whatever 
orientation is initially stronger or salient, as noted above, or the decision is based solely on relieving 
discomfort. Gray (1999) suggests that choices made under negative emotional states are often biased 
toward the alternative that will cause the least discomfort at the time. Taking the path of least 
resistance may seem desirable in the moment but has negative long-term consequences, particularly if 
the relative benefits of the chosen response are artificially exaggerated through response 
amplification. 
Because domination tends to be signified by decisive action (choosing one orientation over the other), 
other actors who are unaware of the issue prompting the ambivalence are likely to draw positive 
conclusions (e.g., “she provides clear direction”). However, where other actors are aware of the issue 
and see merit in both orientations, this positive conclusion is likely to be tempered and perhaps even 
reversed by concerns over the focal actor’s judgment (e.g., “she’s overly simplistic in her thinking”). 
This tempering or reversal is very significant because it suggests that what appears quite positive to the 
uninformed appears quite the opposite to those who better understand the situation. 
Compromise 
Nature of the Response 
Compromise is associated with a moderate focus on both the positive and negative orientations 
(see Figure 2). Compromise involves reciprocal concessions between the opposing orientations such 
that they are mutually accommodated. It can be characterized as a coping mechanism in that it is 
typically a conscious and intentional process, whereby one acknowledges the simultaneous existence 
of the orientations and recognizes the desirability of partially honoring each. In this way, 
compromise—especially the form we refer to below as “black and white”—is more akin to “problem-
focused coping” than “emotion-focused” as the focus is on responding to ambivalence by dealing with 
the cause rather than regulating the associated tension (Lazarus and Folkman 1984). Thus, although 
compromise can be either proactive or reactive, it tends to be more proactive than avoidance or 
domination. 
As a discrete action, compromise can take one of two forms. First, actors can “average” or combine the 
black and white into gray such that a middle ground is found that is not really true to either black or 
white. Such “gray compromises” are common and diverse in organizations; two examples will suffice. 
For one, individuals experiencing ambivalence about a task may self-handicap when they want to 
succeed but doubt their capability. Self-handicapping enables one to externalize failure by deliberately 
acting in ways that inhibit performance (Berglas and Jones 1978). An employee preparing for a 
presentation may procrastinate, making it impossible to prepare thoroughly. By telling coworkers that 
she prepared the slides just minutes before the meeting, she has an excuse if the presentation does 
not go well. Ambivalence was thus reduced by neither completing the task as well as possible (black) 
nor delegating the task to a coworker (white). As another example, Weick (1979) explains a fire 
captain’s choices in responding to a call from an area noted for false alarms. If the captain 
compromises by sending all the firefighters, but at a slower speed than usual, the response is 
inappropriate whether there is a fire or not. If there is a fire, the firefighters will not arrive soon 
enough; if there is not a fire, all the resources have been needlessly sent to the false alarm. As these 
examples illustrate, gray compromises tend to be problematic when at least the core of each 
orientation needs to be preserved. 
A second type of compromise is where neither orientation is sacrificed, nor are the orientations wholly 
honored to the point where they are incompatible. This can be termed a “black and white 
compromise.” To illustrate, the fire captain can act as if there is a fire and as if there is not by very 
promptly sending only some crew members. If there is a fire, the crew has arrived as quickly as 
possible; if there is not a fire, all of the resources were not wasted (Weick 1979). As this example 
illustrates, the actor simultaneously respects the core of each orientation, albeit in a give-and-take 
form. Black and white compromise may also occur sequentially in the form of vacillation, where the 
actor alternates orientations based on the situation (Pratt and Doucet 2000, Tracy 2004). These short-
term fluctuations differ from the macro-oscillation discussed under “domination,” where one 
experiences an entire paradigm shift. The short-term fluctuations, considered as a set, respect both 
orientations, even if each alternation seems to abandon one orientation for the other. Pratt and 
Dutton (2000, p. 117) found that librarians were ambivalent about homeless people in their library, 
feeling “compassion, sympathy, and empathy as well as anger, fear, and disgust.” The library’s director 
gave money to homeless patrons at times and asked them to leave at other times; one librarian would 
sometimes call social services to request help for the homeless and sometimes call the police to 
remove them from the library. As an example at the collective level, Wells (1988) notes that the staff at 
a Girl Scout camp experienced ambivalence because they identified with the organization but were put 
off by the wholesomeness of the Girl Scout identity. As a result, when working in public they strove to 
display a professional image, but behind closed doors they distanced themselves from that identity by 
resorting to humor and derision about the Girl Scout symbols. We posit that it is precisely because the 
librarians and Girl Scout staff opted for a negative orientation at one point that they were able to opt 
for a positive orientation at a later point, and vice versa (Ashforth and Mael 1998; see also Kosmala 
and Herrbach 2006, Kunda 1992). In this case, long-term compromise was attained via short-term 
vacillation. 
Positive and Negative Outcomes 
As suggested above, compromise is generally most effective when neither the positive nor negative 
orientation alone is sufficient (gray or black and white compromise) or the core of each orientation 
needs to be preserved (black and white compromise). However, opposites often do not lend 
themselves readily to negotiation; thus the process of compromise may prove difficult and actual 
resolutions may be hard to discern and enact. Compromise is therefore also more effective when the 
actor has at least moderate discretion or agency. For example, some Benedictine sisters identified with 
the Catholic Church but felt excluded by its male-dominated rituals, creating tension between feelings 
of belonging and exclusion. In response to the resulting ambivalence toward the church, the sisters 
chose to modify their practice of certain church-mandated rituals so that they were more inclusive of 
women (Hoffman and Medlock-Klyukovski 2004). 
As further noted, black and white compromise can also occur over time by vacillating between two 
orientations. However, as Merton (1976, p. 105) puts it, “This delicate process of alternating phases is 
a little like walking a tightrope, with all its attendant risks and successes.” If the core of black and/or 
white matter and are lost, the compromise becomes dysfunctional. 
To recognize a compromise, other actors must be aware of the issue that prompted the ambivalence. 
Thus, actors who are unaware of the issue will have little reason to draw inferences about the focal 
actor. Where other actors are aware of the issue, we posit that compromise is sufficiently normative in 
organizational settings that they are likely to draw positive inferences (e.g., “the team is realistic”). 
However, given organizational norms for consistency (Staw 1980), the vacillating form of compromise 
may induce others to view the actor as inconsistent, indecisive, and perhaps even deliberately 
hypocritical, particularly if the vacillation is prompted by nonconscious—and therefore difficult to 
justify—impulses (cf. Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007). Rothman and Wiesenfeld (2007) add that such 
inferences may elicit frustration in others and inhibit liking and trust. 
Holism 
Nature of the Response 
Unlike compromise, where the actor negates (gray) or diminishes (black and white) the integrity of 
each orientation, or domination, where only one orientation is given expression, holism involves the 
complete, simultaneous, and typically conscious acceptance of both opposing orientations.6 As such, 
holism can usually be characterized as a coping mechanism. Holism is in the same spirit as black and 
white compromise but represents less of a win–lose trade-off between the orientations and more of a 
win–win embracing of both orientations. Accordingly, holism tends to be proactive and generally more 
proactive than compromise. 
The notion of holism raises the question: Given intense ambivalence, how can an actor consciously 
retain it and thus “tolerate” it? The answer, we contend, is through the exercise of wisdom (Kessler 
and Bailey 2007). Weick (1998, 2004) writes of an “attitude of wisdom” where actors balance 
confidence with doubt, ready to act as if they know and yet as if they do not know. Cast in the 
terminology of ambivalence, “knowing” and “doubting” are opposite orientations held simultaneously. 
For example, an attitude of wisdom may involve treating “past experience as a guide as well as a trap” 
(Weick 2004, p. 662). More generally, we view wisdom as the capacity, in part, to simultaneously 
acknowledge and embrace opposing orientations, and thereby strive for a course of action that honors 
both (cf. Clayton 1982, Martin 2009, Weick 1998). This suggests that holding onto the whole of 
ambivalence may actually be functional. This view of wisdom shows the promise of ambivalence, but it 
sheds little light on how wisdom facilitates a holistic response to ambivalence. 
As with the other responses to ambivalence, we argue that holism can be enacted at both the 
individual and collective level. However, because wisdom as a holistic response has received the least 
attention in the literature relative to other responses, we address separately the individual responses 
of “wise actors” and the collective responses of “wise systems.” Once delineated, we then show how 
the two levels of responses may interact (bidirectional arrow 9 in Figure 1). 
Individual responses of wise actors: How, specifically, do wise actors facilitate a holistic approach to 
ambivalence? Building on our reading of the literature, we suggest three related ways: (1) mindfulness, 
(2) “both/and” thinking, and (3) informed choice. Dane (2011, p. 1000; cf. Shapiro and Carlson 
2009) defines mindfulness as “a state of consciousness in which attention is focused on present-
moment phenomena occurring both externally and internally.” Fiol et al. (2009, p. 44) add that 
“[m]indfulness results from a reluctance to simplify”—a willingness to embrace complexity. Most 
important for our purposes, Fiol et al. (2009, p. 44) further note that “[m]indfulness has three key 
characteristics: (1) the creation of new categories of meaning, (2) openness to new information, and 
(3) an implicit awareness of multiple perspectives.” We noted that holism tends to be the most 
proactive of the responses to ambivalence. A mindful actor is more likely to be actively aware of the 
external and/or internal stimuli that have fostered or made salient opposing orientations along with 
the experience of the ambivalence itself. For example, through a series of experiments, Rees et al. 
(2013, p. 367) found that emotional ambivalence increased accuracy in various judgments by 
increasing participants’ receptivity to others’ perspectives, concluding that emotional ambivalence can 
produce a “wise mind.” Mindfulness facilitates both/and thinking, described in detail below, by making 
the issue conscious or at least attuning actors to what may otherwise remain nonconscious (Dane 
2011) and by inhibiting the often reflexive narrowing of attention (Fiol and O’Connor 2003, Weick and 
Putnam 2006) that is the hallmark of domination. In addition, mindfulness may facilitate actions that 
address the negatively viewed aspects of the object in question so that the opposing orientations are 
better able to be meshed. Meyerson (2001) describes a senior vice president of a financial firm who 
was ambivalent about the privileges of office, enjoying her own but perceiving that the distribution of 
the privileges was unfair to other women and minorities. Unlike other, presumably less mindful, 
executives, she responded to the entreaties of working parents by offering more flexible work 
arrangements to accommodate their family obligations, and the firm eventually institutionalized such 
arrangements. Consistent with the awareness enabled by mindfulness, Meyerson describes various 
behaviors through which actors may approach ambivalence holistically, from “turning personal threats 
into opportunities” to “leveraging small wins” to “organizing collective action” (p. 8). 
The second way that wisdom facilitates a holistic approach to ambivalence is through both/and rather 
than either/or thinking. Either/or thinking refers to a tendency to separate the orientations, creating a 
dichotomy (e.g., a selection committee glorifies a job candidate for the high depth of her industry 
experience or demonizes the candidate for the low breadth of her experience across industries), 
whereas both/and thinking refers to a tendency to juxtapose the orientations, potentially resulting in 
perceived complementarity and even synergy (e.g., the committee recognizes that the low breadth 
made the high depth possible; see, e.g., Cameron et al. 2006, Chen 2002, Jubas and Butterwick 2008). 
Both/and thinking involves developing a more comprehensive understanding of the opposition at the 
heart of ambivalence—a synthesis of sorts of the “thesis/antithesis” that the opposition represents, a 
transcendence of the particulars. However, in holism the thesis and antithesis do not disappear; holism 
thus enables the actor to appreciate that the aspects of the object that engender the opposing 
orientations are integral to the object and perhaps even desirable (cf. Lewis 2000; cf. Janusian 
thinking, Rothenberg 1979). For example, the literature on organizational ambidexterity suggests that 
when actors embrace the apparent contradiction between the need for exploration and the need for 
exploitation—and the resulting ambivalence toward each—more nuanced and jointly optimizing 
actions can result (e.g., Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Smith and Tushman 2005). As F. Scott Fitzgerald 
(1945, p. 69) famously stated, 
The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the 
same time, and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that 
things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise. 
Research suggests that ambivalence motivates heightened information processing (Jonas et al. 
1997, Maio et al. 2001). Through both/and thinking, the actor recognizes the integrity underlying the 
aspects of the object that give rise to ambivalence. That is, the actor may respond to the whole object, 
not just to its favored aspects (as in domination). Furthermore, the actor does so in a manner that 
honors that integrity, rather than betrays animus toward its constituent parts. Plambeck and Weber 
(2010, p. 694) find that CEOs who were the most ambivalent about the enlargement of the European 
Union engaged in “strategic ambidexterity,” where the orientation of their firms was simultaneously 
offensive and defensive, increasing the spectrum of information considered in strategic actions (see 
also Tang et al. 2010). Similarly, Lüscher and Lewis (2008) describe an intervention for production 
managers at Lego Company in the wake of a major restructuring from a traditional hierarchy to self-
managing teams. Rather than be paralyzed by the resulting dilemmas that invited ambivalence (e.g., 
empowering teams versus controlling them), managers were encouraged to embrace the dilemmas 
and forgo simplistic either/or thinking in favor of both/and thinking. Lüscher and Lewis conclude, “Such 
awareness was empowering, reducing tendencies to blame executives [for sending mixed messages] 
and shifting responsibility to the managers to find means of living with tensions” (p. 234). 
As these examples suggest, both/and thinking in the context of holism does not mean that the 
negative orientation is necessarily converted into a positive orientation, only that the actor is able to 
make sense of the object in such a way that the totality of the object and the ambivalence it spawns is 
accepted and perhaps even prized. This also does not mean that the discomfort that attends 
ambivalence is necessarily reduced, given that the opposing orientations are actively sustained. Rather, 
it speaks to the actor coming to terms with the experience of ambivalence. To illustrate, Wright 
(2009) describes the ambivalent organizational identification of internal organizational consultants. 
The consultants simultaneously felt both attached as employees of the organization and detached as 
objective evaluators of the organization. Some came to regard their unique position of being 
“outsiders within” as a “positive source of strength and distinctiveness” (p. 319). 
The third way that wisdom facilitates holism is through informed choice. Research on commitment 
(Brickman 1987, Pratt and Rosa 2003) and trust (Pratt and Dirks 2006) illustrates holism as a choice 
made by wise actors. Brickman (1987) suggests that commitment is the “antidote” to ambivalence. 
How he views commitment, however, is much different from behavioral/escalation approaches 
(Salancik 1977) or attitudinal approaches to commitment (see Pratt and Rosa 2003). In Brickman’s 
view, actors must first know the positive and negative “elements” (p. 7) associated with forming an 
attachment to a person, idea, or other object. These positive and negative elements are not divisible 
from the object. Pratt and Rosa (2003, p. 395), for instance, describe how network marketing firms 
“harvest” work–family conflict to transform individuals’ emotional ambivalence about the firm into 
commitment. They deliberately recruit individuals who are at risk for work–family conflict and 
encourage them to frame work in terms of helping their family (e.g., “you’re doing this for your 
children”), to recruit their own family and friends to help with bookkeeping and distribution, and to 
avoid those who would “steal their dreams” (p. 411). For Brickman, commitment involves the binding 
of the positive (helping one’s family) and negative (sacrifice) elements through choosing a course of 
action. Indeed, Pratt and Rosa report that newcomers experiencing little emotional ambivalence 
ultimately had weak commitment to the organization. Pratt and Dirks (2006) make a similar argument 
about ambivalence and choice when discussing the concept of trust in organizations. Trust involves 
being vulnerable so as to achieve something positive in a relationship in the future (Rousseau et al. 
1998). They suggest that trust involves choosing both a positive (future reward) and negative 
(vulnerability) element simultaneously. 
To be sure, sometimes the negative elements will be more salient (similar to “being committed” to an 
asylum) while at other times the positive elements will be more salient. But at its core, both positive 
and negative elements always remain. Thus, commitment as a holistic action differs from compromise 
or domination where one orientation is diluted or discarded. Furthermore, by choosing to accept the 
opposition, the actor transforms what may have been outside his or her control—such as opposing 
norms—into something that is experienced as more controllable (Harrist 2006, Meyerson 2001). In 
short, an actor may not choose to be exposed to ambivalence but can choose how to respond to it—to 
accept that ambivalence as an essential element for commitment or trust. For instance, Ashcraft 
(2001) describes the “organized dissonance” of a feminist bureaucracy that assisted victims of 
domestic violence. Faced with ambivalence about relying on a traditional hierarchy (hierarchy both 
facilitates and impedes the mission), members opted to embrace the ambivalence and utilize a 
hierarchy in a nontraditional manner with informal, egalitarian practices (e.g., consensual decision 
making, eschewing heavy-handed supervision). 
Collective responses via wise systems: A wise system is a set of practices, as embodied in informal (e.g., 
culture) and formal structure, for actively embracing and honoring positive and negative orientations 
toward an object. Wise systems keep ambivalence in play. Under both/and thinking, we 
quoted Lüscher and Lewis (2008, p. 234) that wise actors “find means of living with tensions.” Similarly, 
a wise system connects opposing orientations in a more or less ongoing manner to keep alive “creative 
tension” (Cameron 1986, p. 549) and thus the potential to honor the orientations in adaptive and novel 
ways as emerging circumstances warrant. Research on organized dissonance (Ashcraft 2001), 
organizational ambidexterity (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008), organizational dualities (Ashforth and 
Reingen 2014), and organizational mindfulness (Farjoun 2010) provide examples of how organizations 
may eschew one-time responses to ambivalence in favor of an ongoing juxtaposition of the 
orientations fueling ambivalence. For example, Ashcraft (2001, p. 1315) writes of the need for periodic 
“group reflection as a safety valve that keeps contradiction alive.” 
Culture refers to a set of values, beliefs, norms, and assumptions that typify an organization or subunit 
(cf. Schein 2010). A culture conducive to holism is one that privileges certain values (e.g., openness, 
inquiry), beliefs (e.g., progress results from a full airing of both sides of an issue, the complexity of the 
decision making process should reflect the complexity of the issue), norms (e.g., encourage wide 
participation, have second-chance meetings to reconsider decisions), and assumptions (e.g., 
ambivalence is normal, reasonable group members can disagree). For instance, we 
mentioned Ashforth and Reingen’s (2014) study of a natural food cooperative, where ambivalence 
over business values and idealistic values was kept simmering. Numerous meetings were held to allow 
discussions of ambivalence-provoking issues, and certain rituals (e.g., appeals to collective interest, 
apologies for rudeness) helped regulate the resulting conflicts. Members described their decision-
making process as decidedly “messy,” a term that we speculate generally describes wise systems. 
Structure refers to the design of the organization or subunit. Wise systems appear to facilitate holism 
through either differentiation (complemented with integration; cf. Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) or 
nondifferentiation. We noted earlier that organizations frequently embody hybrid identities and 
pursue contradictory goals, prompting ambivalence toward any one identity or goal. In differentiation, 
these identities and goals are assigned to (or emerge within) separate actors. For example, Raisch and 
Birkinshaw’s (2008) review of the literature on organizational ambidexterity suggests that one way 
organizations address the efficiency–innovation trade-off, and the ambivalence it triggers toward each, 
is by assigning each to separate subunits. Differentiation thus allows each subunit to pursue a 
particular goal, devoid of ambivalence. Similarly, a group may designate a specific member to play the 
role of devil’s advocate and represent the misgivings of other group members, thereby releasing the 
other members from the burden of mixed feelings (Smith and Berg 1987). As Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) argue, differentiation creates a need for integration to then reknit the actors together so that 
the collective can move forward as a more or less unitary body. Thus, differentiated organizations tend 
to create integration mechanisms, such as having senior management provide strategic integration of 
the efficiency- and innovation-oriented subunits (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008) or having a matrix 
structure that intentionally juxtaposes a functional focus with a product focus (Galbraith 2009). In 
terms of ambivalence, then, differentiation and integration facilitate a holistic approach by fostering an 
ongoing creative tension between the identities/goals. In these examples, the underlying cause of 
ambivalence at one level is “resolved” by activities at another level; indeed, what appears to be 
domination at the lower level (e.g., within a given subunit) may help foster holism at the higher level. 
In nondifferentiation, the identities/goals are jointly allocated to subunits or individuals so that actors 
must each struggle with the oppositions and hence the ambivalence toward any given identity or goal. 
As such, structures predicated on nondifferentiation tend to be less complex than those predicated on 
differentiation and integration. An example is for-profit hospitals where the medical staff is expected 
to jointly weigh the sometimes oppositional goals of patient service and cost considerations (Shore 
1998). Note, however, that the structure per se does not actually facilitate actors’ responses to 
ambivalence; it simply makes ambivalence that much more intense and salient. Thus, to qualify as a 
holistic approach, nondifferentiation must be complemented with the other aspects of a wise system. 
Wise actors ↔ wise systems: The notions of wise actors at the individual level and wise systems at the 
collective level raise the question of how wisdom may play out across levels of analysis. What wise 
actors do may ultimately become institutionalized in the culture and structure of the wider 
organization. Wise actors, in short, can give rise to wise systems (arrow 9 in the upward direction 
in Figure 1; see Bierly and Kolodinsky 2007, Bierly et al. 2000). Martin (2009) describes how a sharp 
increase in research and development spending at Procter & Gamble (P&G) led to disappointing results 
and thus to ambivalence about the desirability of such spending (is it a good investment or a bad 
investment?). Helping to fuel the negative orientation to research and development spending was a 
belief among some senior executives that P&G was primarily a marketing company. CEO A. G. Lafley 
facilitated an effective approach dubbed “Connect & Develop,” which derived synergies from the 
positive and negative orientations, thereby “reconciling the irreconcilable” (p. 58). Specifically, Lafley 
set a goal that 50% of P&G’s innovations come from outside the firm, with P&G leveraging those 
innovations through its marketing and distribution muscle, thereby institutionalizing his own wisdom. 
By the same token, wise systems can promote and reinforce the wisdom of individuals. In short, wise 
systems can give rise to wise actors (arrow 9 in the downward direction in Figure 1). 
Following Sternberg (1998; cf. Bigelow 1992), wisdom is acquired by gaining tacit knowledge over time 
and is best developed through dialectical processes; clearly, the more ambivalent experiences actors 
have, the more opportunities they have to wrestle with such processes (in the form of oppositional 
tendencies). This suggests that a wise system, where ambivalence is actively kept alive, may provide 
the seedbed for actors to become wise(r). For instance, Plambeck and Weber (2010) found that 
organizational characteristics that supply and facilitate diverse perspectives on a given issue, such as 
ambidextrous strategies and the functional diversity of the top management team, were more likely to 
have CEOs who reported ambivalence toward strategic issues. Although it is not clear what is cause 
and what is effect here, wise actors and wise systems can reinforce each other. 
Even though wisdom appears far more likely to result from a combination of wise actors in wise 
systems, our interpretation of examples of ambivalence in the literature suggests that it is possible for 
wisdom to result from wise actors working within an “unwise” system or from “unwise” actors working 
within a wise system. In short, the wisdom of the actors or of the system can compensate for its 
absence in the other. Whereas the popular press has many stories of heroic and often wise innovators, 
whistleblowers, and leaders salvaging faulty organizations, the notion of unwise actors in a wise 
system is less obvious. In Ashforth and Reingen’s (2014) study of a natural food co-op, advocates of the 
business values and advocates of the idealistic values tended to stubbornly deny and resist the views of 
their opponents. The authors liken the dynamics to the oppositional politics of Democrats and 
Republicans in the American political system (cf. Maybury-Lewis and Almagor 1989). In the co-op, 
wisdom was not a function of the actors but of the system that forcibly juxtaposed their views. Thus, 
as Bierly et al. (2000, p. 597) note, “[O]rganizations can act wisely even though it may not be possible 
to ascribe wisdom to any individual actor within the organization.” 
Can unwise actors in unwise systems nonetheless enact holism in response to ambivalence? It seems 
very unlikely. Given that wisdom is in part the capacity to simultaneously acknowledge and embrace 
oppositional orientations, it is difficult to see how an unwise actor in an unwise system would have the 
wherewithal to truly engage such orientations. That said, unwise actors in an unwise system may 
nonetheless be induced to attempt the processes that typify wisdom, as when external consultants try 
to restore an organization’s health (e.g., Lüscher and Lewis 2008), or may, through trial and error, 
discover such processes. Thus, unwise actors in an unwise system need not be a permanent condition. 
In sum, wise actors and wise systems are mutually reinforcing, as a holistic approach to ambivalence 
reinforces and further develops wisdom. 
Positive and Negative Outcomes 
The discussion above suggests that holism is generally most effective when the full integrity of both 
orientations needs to be preserved, coupled with an actor who has sufficient discretion or agency—or 
a system with sufficient resources—to enact both the demanding process and the (typically) complex 
“resolution” of the underlying causes of the ambivalence. But how can individuals or collectives know 
when the full integrity of opposing orientations needs to be preserved? They may have to engage in 
holistic processes to even discern whether there is indeed an integrity that should and can be honored; 
therefore holism represents something of a leap of faith. That said, the desirability of full integrity is 
likely to be signaled before the fact by (1) the issue’s apparent significance (e.g., an issue that deeply 
affects an actor’s goals and functions, a persistent or recurring issue, an issue with key stakeholders 
aligned with each orientation) and (2) potential synergies that may be realized from simultaneously 
holding or even integrating the orientations (e.g., perceiving an opportunity to learn and innovate, 
recognizing that the positive orientation needs to be tempered by the concerns fueling the negative 
orientation) (cf. Martin 2009, Thomas 1992). 
Our discussion above also suggests the following positive outcomes of holism: (1) neither orientation is 
diminished; (2) growth in the actor’s understanding and appreciation of the object, fostering 
commitment to and trust in the object; (3) adaptability, that is, retaining the capacity to act in multiple 
and seemingly inconsistent ways, depending on the situation; and (4) acting as a change agent, that is, 
mindfully nudging the object (or system) in positive ways even while expressing the actor’s belief in the 
integrity of the object. However, a problematic feature of holism is that the requisite wisdom is very 
difficult to cultivate and sustain, and it is often unclear what specific behaviors should flow from 
wisdom in any event. Not surprisingly, then, Weick (1998) acknowledges that the pursuit of an attitude 
of wisdom—ambivalence that tempers knowing with doubting—can undermine confidence and impair 
action (see also Pratt and Pradies 2011). Furthermore, by actively keeping both orientations alive, 
holism may not relieve the discomfort that attends ambivalence. 
Finally, as with compromise, to recognize a holistic response, other actors must be aware of the issue 
that prompted the ambivalence. As noted, observers expect consistency and decisiveness from actors 
rather than expressions of ambivalence (Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007). Thus, as with the vacillating 
form of black and white compromise, holism may result in behaviors that appear to others to be 
inconsistent in the short term—even if, when considered as a series over time, they are actually quite 
nuanced and respect the totality of the object. In short, because the effectiveness of holism is often 
only revealed over time, holism may lead to the actor being perceived as indecisive, inconsistent, or 
hypocritical, at least in the short term. For example, Cha and Edmondson (2006) studied a company 
whose CEO espoused employees’ best interests and being a family as key values. When the company 
more than doubled in size over three years, employees made hypocritical attributions about the CEO’s 
actions, viewing this growth as threatening their best interests (e.g., loss of camaraderie). However, in 
an interview with the authors, the CEO said he actually viewed growth, in part, as a vehicle for 
employee development and wage growth. This cautionary tale implies that the negative attributions 
arising from seemingly inconsistent actions can be mitigated and even reversed if the actor is able to 
clearly articulate a compelling need for holism. 
To summarize, Figure 2 depicts a conceptual framework for organizing actors’ responses to 
ambivalence in organizational settings and underscores that each response is associated with certain 
trade-offs that may make it, depending on the situation, functional or dysfunctional. The main 
arguments are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 Actor Responses to Ambivalence: Description, Examples, Outcomes, and Conditions 
  Avoidance Domination Compromise Holism 
Description • The nonconscious and/or 
conscious evasion of the 
ambivalence caused by 
the opposing 
orientations. 
• Typically reactive rather 
than proactive. 
• The nonconscious and/or 
conscious bolstering of one 
orientation so that it 
overwhelms the other. 
• Typically reactive rather than 
proactive. 




— Gray compromise 
— Black and white 
compromise. 
• Proactive or reactive. 
• The simultaneous and 
typically conscious 
acceptance of both 
opposing orientations. 
• Typically proactive rather 
than reactive. 
Examples • Nurses who smoked 
were ambivalent about 
their responsibility for 
advising patients against 
smoking. When a need 
for such advice appeared 
low, some nurses tended 
to avoid advising 
patients against smoking 
(Radsma and Bottorff 
2009). 





regarding the behavior 
of officers toward 
inmates (e.g., nurture 
versus discipline). 
However, the facilities’ 
cultures made the 
complex tensions seem 
straightforward and 
strongly discouraged 
officers from asking 
questions, thereby 
promoting avoidance of 
the resulting 
ambivalence. 
• Arribas-Ayllon et al. 
(2009) discuss the 
ambivalence felt among 
professionals involved in 
genetic counseling who could 
see the benefits but also 
sensed moral danger in the 
practice. In response to 
parents seeking a genetic test 
for their child without 
considering the ethical 
implications, the 
professionals alleviated their 
ambivalence by citing 
“extreme case scenarios” (p. 
183) that painted the parents 
as unreasonable. 
• Bowles (1991), 
interpreting Kriegler (1980), 
describes the ambivalence 
that a group of shipyard 
managers felt from inflicting 
terrible work conditions on 
workers with whom they 
empathized. To reconcile the 
demeaning work they 
demanded of good people, 
the managers demeaned the 
workers, allowing the 




occupied their library 
but also felt 
responsible for 
eliminating disruptions 
to patrons. In response 
to the resulting 
ambivalence, librarians 
vacillated in their 
behavior (e.g., at times 
calling police to 
remove the homeless, 
at other times calling 
social agencies to 
provide help) (Pratt 
and Dutton 2000). 




competition) that are 
likely to provoke 
ambivalence (e.g., we 
should cooperate and 
not cooperate). 
Accordingly, strategic 
alliances may opt for 
• Internal organizational 
consultants felt ambivalent 
because they 
simultaneously felt 
attached as insiders of the 
organization and detached 
as objective 
evaluators. Wright (2009, p. 
319) found that some 
consultants viewed their 
unique position of being 
both “insiders” (employees) 
and “outsiders” (roving 
consultants) as a “positive 
source of strength and 
distinctiveness.” 
• A natural food cooperative 
experienced tension 
between its idealistic values 
(which supported the 
organization’s mission) and 
its business values (which 
kept the organization 
financially sound). The 
organization kept the 
resulting ambivalence in 
play by meetings that tacitly 
surfaced the tension, 
complemented with certain 
rituals that helped regulate 
managers to see both the 
work and workers negatively. 
“balancing” the 
opposing tensions (Das 
and Teng 2000, p. 84). 
the resulting conflicts (e.g., 
appeals to collective 
interest, apologies for 




• Reduces tension to a 
more tolerable level, 
enabling performance 
and the other responses 
to ambivalence. 
• Alleviates tension, aligns 
thoughts and feelings with 
behavior. 
• May lead to positive (e.g., 
decisive, clear) attributions 
by other actors who are 
unaware of the issue 
prompting ambivalence. 
• Maintains each 
orientation. 
• May lead to positive 
(e.g., realistic, 
practical) attributions 
by other actors who 
are aware of the issue 
prompting 
ambivalence. 
• Causes both orientations to 
be fully embraced, 
facilitating growth in 
understanding and 
appreciation of the object 
as well as commitment to 
the object. 
• Facilitates adaptability. 
• Enables acting as a change 
agent. 
• Reinforces wisdom. 
• May lead to positive (e.g., 
prudent) attributions by 
other actors if the actor 
articulates a compelling 
need for holism. 
Outcomes: 
Negative 
• May prevent recognition 
of ambivalence, 
inhibiting learning and 
problem solving. 
• May prove futile; may 
backfire and render 
ambivalence more 
salient. 
• May lead to negative 
attributions by other 
actors if the issue is 
regarded as important. 
• Sacrifices integrity of both 
orientations. 
• May be biased toward 
whatever orientation is 
initially stronger or more 
salient, or is the least 
uncomfortable, rather than 
the most effective. 
• May lead to negative (e.g., 
simplistic, reckless) 
attribtuions by other actors 
who are aware of the issue 
and see merit in both 
orientations. 
• May be difficult to 
implement the 
process, and the 
outcomes may be 
elusive. 




vacillation by other 
actors, absent 
awareness of the issue 
prompting 
ambivalence. 
• May be difficult to cultivate 
and sustain an attitude of 
wisdom. 
• Is often unclear what 
behaviors should result. 
• May not relieve discomfort. 
• May lead to negative (e.g., 
inconsistent, hypocritical) 
attributions by other actors, 
absent an articulated need. 
Conditions 
under 
which it is 
most 
effective 
• Immediate action is not 
required. 
• The actor has low 
discretion or agency. 
• The core of both orientations 
does not need to be 
preserved. 
• Neither orientation 
alone is sufficient (gray 
or black and white 
compromise), or the 
core of both 
• The full integrity of both 
orientations needs to be 
preserved. 
• The actor has high 
discretion or agency (or, in 
• The actor must choose 
between mutually exclusive 
orientations. 
• One orientation is actually 
counterproductive. 
• The actor has low discretion 
or agency. 
orientations needs to 
be preserved (black 
and white 
compromise). 
• The actor has at least 
moderate discretion or 
agency. 
the case of wise systems, 
the system has sufficient 
resources). 
Discussion 
Ambivalence is defined as simultaneously positive and negative orientations toward an object. We 
developed a multilevel perspective on ambivalence in organizations that demonstrates how this 
phenomenon is integral to cognitive/emotional processes and important outcomes. Specifically, we 
argued that ambivalence results from oppositions (a demand for A and not-A) manifested in 
organizational contexts as hybrid identities, contradictory goals, role conflicts; dualities; multifaceted 
objects; and temporal factors. As displayed in Figure 1, these oppositions can trigger ambivalence at 
the individual level or collective level of analysis, which may diffuse to the other level through cognitive 
(sensemaking, sensegiving) and emotional (emotional contagion, emotions-as-social-
information/emotional comparison) processes and prompt responses at each level (i.e., avoidance, 
domination, compromise, holism). 
Although previous research has identified various defense and coping mechanisms for responding to 
ambivalence, it focused on a limited set of the potential responses and lacked a conceptual framework 
for organizing these responses. Crossing two dimensions—a focus on the positive orientation toward 
the object in question and a focus on the negative orientation—enabled us to organize the better-
known responses under the labels of avoidance (the focus on each is low), compromise (each is 
moderate), and domination (one is low and one is high) and to identify an intriguing but little-known 
response that we dubbed holism (each orientation is high). We argued that each response is applicable 
at the individual and collective levels of analysis and provided examples from the literature, although 
the original authors, of course, had not employed our framework. As summarized in Table 3, each 
response has positive and negative outcomes and is most effective under certain conditions. However, 
holism tends to be the most difficult to attain as it requires embracing both orientations 
simultaneously, suggesting the need for wise actors and/or wise systems. An image of the ambivalent 
and wise actor starkly contrasts with the popular image of an ambivalent actor as confused and 
indecisive (i.e., weak; see Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007). 
Implications for Future Research 
Our analysis suggests numerous possibilities for future research. We see the following five as 
particularly important. First, we argued that the specific organizational triggers of ambivalence are 
amenable to various responses, subject to the contingencies in Table 3 (see the “Conditions under 
which it is most effective” row). Future research should explore this argument. For example, perhaps 
certain triggers are more controllable by actors (e.g., hybrid identities versus a multifaceted job), 
encouraging more proactive and substantive responses. Or perhaps stakeholders hold normative 
expectations regarding the appropriate ways of addressing specific triggers, thereby limiting actors’ 
response repertoire. For instance, investors with a long-term stake in a corporation may have little 
tolerance for the use of avoidance in the face of the change–continuity, global–local, or quality–
efficiency dualities. 
Second, our discussion of the four responses did not distinguish between the individual and collective 
levels of analysis. Indeed, each response has analogs at both levels of analysis, with the exception of 
specific tactics such as structural differentiation and integration, which cannot be enacted at the 
individual level. Importantly, though, it appears that ambivalence is easier to respond to (albeit not 
necessarily more effectively) at the collective level than at the individual level because members of the 
collective can help socially construct and sustain a reality that objective observers would disavow 
(e.g., Choo 1996, Hardin and Higgins 1996). Prime examples include the avoidance responses of denial 
and splitting (e.g., Smith and Berg 1987, Wexler 1993). Indeed, responses may become 
institutionalized—even if they are not particularly effective—such that they become taken-for-granted 
aspects of organizational life. Argyris (1985, 1990), for instance, writes of the reflexive defense 
mechanisms in organizations that routinely block desirable change. Future research should determine 
the applicability and boundary conditions of the various techniques for managing ambivalence at each 
level of analysis. 
Third, we identified holism as an intriguing but little-researched phenomenon. Future research should 
focus on assessing and fleshing out our description of holism. In particular, we argued that wise actors 
embrace opposing orientations toward an object via mindfulness, both/and thinking, and informed 
choice. What synergies exist among these processes? What contextual factors are most conducive and 
least conducive to each practice? Are there additional processes through which wisdom is enacted? To 
what extent are holistic responses to ambivalence trainable and what specific practices might help 
cultivate wisdom? For instance, we noted that wise systems may help foster wise actors by actively 
keeping ambivalence alive and stimulating dialectical thinking. We described a wise system as a set of 
practices embodied in culture and structure for embracing opposing orientations. Are there particular 
sets of values, beliefs, norms, and assumptions that are necessary for a wise system, or is wisdom more 
of a “fuzzy set” of cultural properties? Differentiation and nondifferentiation suggest diametrically 
different structural approaches for institutionalizing wisdom; under what conditions is each approach 
preferable? For example, because differentiation essentially removes the burden of ambivalence from 
single actors (by distributing the opposing orientations across actors), it is likely more accommodating 
of unwise actors than is nondifferentiation. Finally, we discussed how wise actors and wise systems are 
mutually reinforcing. Future research might also explore means of fostering and sustaining the wisdom 
of both actors and systems, such as through the institutionalization of external reviews, devil’s 
advocates, and training in counterfactual thinking (cf. remedies for groupthink and escalation of 
commitment; see, e.g., Ku 2008). Might it be possible to create reinforcing systems that create virtuous 
cycles of wisdom? 
Fourth, whereas we have treated the responses to ambivalence separately, future research should 
examine how they relate to one another. For instance, we mentioned that avoidance may reduce 
debilitating tension and thereby facilitate compromise and holism. Similarly, compromise may serve as 
a fallback if holism fails. Although the responses appear to generally serve as substitutes (e.g., 
domination may obviate the need for holism), a given response may prove inadequate at rendering the 
ambivalence less intense, thus provoking another response. In particular, one general response 
trajectory may be to move “up the ladder” toward typically more conscious, proactive, and effortful 
responses in the search for a resolution of the intense ambivalence; that is, avoidance → domination 
→ gray compromise → black and white compromise → holism. For example, Gilbert (2006) discusses 
how a newspaper organization initially framed the emergence of the Internet as an opportunity but, in 
the face of setbacks, it responded to the presumable ambivalence by reframing it as a major threat 
(domination). However, with continued experience, the organization came to see the Internet as both 
an opportunity (for its online division) and a threat (for its print division), with the corporate level 
providing the strategic integration (holism). Conversely, an actor may be overwhelmed by the tension 
caused by a failed response; may dismiss more conscious, proactive, and effortful responses as 
untenable; or may not even consider the possibility of such responses. In such cases, the actor may 
move “down the ladder.” Future research exploring such trajectories will add a welcome dynamic 
element to the model. 
Finally, the integrative framework of responses to ambivalence may help shed new light on a variety of 
organizational studies’ topics across levels of analysis, from decision making to motivation, groupthink 
to group conflict, and organizational learning to organizational design. A prime example is leadership. 
We noted earlier that leaders may express and thereby sow their ambivalence in the organization. 
Although the literature typically regards this as quite dysfunctional (e.g., Larson and Tompkins 
2005, Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007), our analysis suggests that there are times when 
leaders should actively sow ambivalence as a means of fostering personal growth, nuanced decision 
making, adaptation, and creativity. Thus, perspectives on transformational leadership, spiritual 
leadership, and servant leadership may be enriched by considering the potential role of ambivalence in 
fomenting actor change. Furthermore, given that each of the four responses to ambivalence is most 
effective under certain conditions, and that there are various ways that a given response can be 
enacted, leaders can serve as potent role models for when and how to enact the responses. Finally, 
leaders likely act as important conduits for institutionalizing responses to ambivalence in the culture 
and structure of organizations. Our larger point, then, is that the model of responses to ambivalence 
has the potential to inform a variety of traditional organizational topics in novel ways. 
Conclusion 
Far from indicating a rare and negative experience, ambivalence appears to be ubiquitous in 
organizational settings and—although uncomfortable—ambivalence has the potential to help foster 
growth and richly nuanced behavior. The discussion helps inform our understanding of how 
organizational triggers foster ambivalence at the collective and individual levels of analysis, how 
ambivalence diffuses across levels, and how actors are likely to respond to ambivalence and with what 
positive and negative effects. 
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Endnotes 
1 Pratt and Pradies (2011), who are primarily interested in “positive” responses to ambivalence, 
suggest that responses may vary in terms of their likelihood of leading to narrowed or 
expanded avenues for future action. This shifts the basis of comparison to response potentials. 
Because of our interest in understanding how responses relate to each other in terms of their 
orientations toward the same target (rather than in the future responses they might engender), 
we arrive at a very different way to organize responses. 
2 Given that cognition and emotion are typically intertwined (Elfenbein 2007)—particularly in cases of 
intense ambivalence—we will not explore differences between cognitive ambivalence and 
emotional ambivalence (see Lavine et al. 1998 for a treatment of affective–cognitive 
ambivalence; Conner and Armitage 2008 for attitudinal ambivalence, which combines cognition 
and affect; and Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007 for emotional ambivalence). 
3 Building off work by Smith and Berg (1987) at the group level and Weick (2002) at a broader network 
level, Pradies and Pratt (2010) argue that collectives can be conceptualized as ambivalent when 
they are composed of actors who (1) are each ambivalent (holographic ambivalence) or (2) are 
not ambivalent themselves but who hold thoughts or feelings that directly oppose those of 
other actors such that the collective can be said to be ambivalent (ideographic ambivalence). 
Because of our interest in a multilevel model, and because there is not a direct individual-level 
correlate with ideographic ambivalence (which requires multiple actors), we will focus mainly 
on holographic ambivalence. 
4 Kozlowski and Klein (2000, p. 16) contrast composition effects with “compilation” effects—that is, 
when members of the collective have divergent perspectives/experiences but, when juxtaposed 
like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, form a meaningful pattern. Compilation effects are more relevant 
to arrow 2 in Figure 1, as members of a collective socially construct a mutual understanding of a 
given organizational trigger. 
5 We recognize that for a given example of defense mechanisms and coping mechanisms it is often 
impossible to know the degree to which the response was indeed nonconscious or conscious. In 
the examples below, we are inferring the level of consciousness from the authors’ descriptions. 
6 We say only “typically conscious” because holistic approaches may be the product of “unwise” actors 
in a “wise” system (as explained below) or may, through repeated enactment, become at least 
somewhat automatic. 
References 
Adler PS (2012) The sociological ambivalence of bureaucracy: From Weber via Gouldner to 
Marx. Organ. Sci. 23(1):244–266.  
Albert S, Whetten DA (1985) Organizational identity. Cummings LL, Staw BM, eds. Research in 
Organizatonal Behavior, Vol. 7 (JAI Press, Greenwich, CT), 263–295.  
Andrews G, Singh M, Bond M (1993) The defense style questionnaire. J. Nervous Mental 
Disease 181(4):246–256.  
Argyris C (1985) Strategy, Change and Defensive Routines (Pitman, Boston).  
Argyris C (1990) Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning (Allyn and 
Bacon, Needham Heights, MA).  
Argyris C (1993) Knowledge for Action: A Guide to Overcoming Barriers to Overcoming Change (Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco).  
Arribas-Ayllon M, Sarangi S, Clarke A (2009) Professional ambivalence: Accounts of ethical practice in 
childhood genetic testing. J. Genetic Counsel. 18:173–184.  
Ashakanasy [sic] NM, Humphrey RH (2011) A multi-level view of leadership and emotion: Leading with 
emotional labor. Bryman A, Collinson D, Grint K, Jackson B, Uhl-Bien M, eds. The Sage 
Handbook of Leadership (Sage, Los Angeles), 365–379.  
Ashcraft KL (2001) Organized dissonance: Feminist bureaucracy as hybrid form. Acad. Management 
J. 44(6):1301–1322.  
Ashforth BE, Mael FA (1998) The power of resistance: Sustaining valued identities. Kramer RM, Neale 
MA, eds. Power and Influence in Organizations (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA), 89–119.  
Ashforth BE, Reingen PH (2014) Functions of dysfunction: Managing the dynamics of an organizational 
duality in a natural food cooperative. Admin. Sci. Quart., ePub ahead of print May 23.  
Ashforth BE, Saks AM (2002) Feeling your way: Emotion and organizational entry. Lord RG, Klimoski RJ, 
Kanfer R, eds. Emotions in the Workplace: Understanding the Structure and Role of Emotions in 
Organizational Behavior (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco), 331–369.  
Ashforth BE, Rogers KM, Corley KG (2011) Identity in organizations: Exploring cross-level 
dynamics. Organ. Sci. 22(5):1144–1156.  
Ashforth BE, Joshi M, Anand V, O’Leary-Kelly AM (2013) Extending the expanded model of 
organizational identification to occupations. J. Appl. Soc. Psych. 43(12):2426–2448.  
Baek YM (2010) An integrative model of ambivalence. Soc. Sci. J. 47(3):609–629.  
Bandura A (1977) Social Learning Theory (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ).  
Barsade SG (2002) The ripple effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on group behavior. Admin. 
Sci. Quart. 47(4):644–675.  
Barsade SG, Gibson DE (1998) Group emotion: A view from top and bottom. Gruenfeld DH, Neale MA, 
Mannix EA, eds. Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Vol. 1 (JAI Press, Stamford, CT), 81–
102.  
Bartel CA, Saavedra R (2000) The collective construction of work group moods. Admin. Sci. 
Quart. 45(2):197–231.  
Baumeister RF, Dale K, Sommer KL (1998) Freudian defense mechanisms and empirical findings in 
modern social psychology: Reaction formation, projection, displacement, undoing, isolation, 
sublimation, and denial. J. Personality 66(6):1081–1124.  
Bell DW, Esses VM (1997) Ambivalence and response amplification toward Native peoples. J. Appl. Soc. 
Psych. 27(12):1063–1084.  
Bell DW, Esses VM (2002) Ambivalence and response amplification: A motivational 
perspective. Personality Soc. Psych. Bull. 28(8):1143–1152.  
Berglas S, Jones EE (1978) Drug choice as a self-handicapping strategy in response to noncontingent 
success. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 36(4):405–417.  
Bierly PE III, Kolodinsky RW (2007) Strategic logic: Toward a wisdom-based approach to strategic 
management. Kessler EH, Bailey JR, eds. Handbook of Organizational and Managerial 
Wisdom (Sage, Los Angeles), 61–88.  
Bierly PE III, Kessler EH, Christensen EW (2000) Organizational learning, knowledge and wisdom. J. 
Organ. Change Management 13(6):595–618.  
Bigelow J (1992) Developing managerial wisdom. J. Management Inquiry 1(2):143–153.  
Blake RR, Mouton JS (1964) The Managerial Grid: Key Orientations for Achieving Production Through 
People (Gulf, Houston).  
Bowlby J (1982) Attachment and Loss: Attachment, 2nd ed., Vol. 1 (Basic Books, New York).  
Bowles ML (1991) The organization shadow. Organ. Stud. 12(3):387–404.  
Brickman P (1987) Commitment, Conflict, and Caring (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ).  
Bridge K, Baxter LA (1992) Blended relationships: Friends as work associates. Western J. 
Comm. 56(3):200–225.  
Brief AP (1998) Attitudes in and Around Organizations (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA).  
Brooks ME, Highhouse S (2006) Familiarity breeds ambivalence. Corporate Reputation Rev. 9(2):105–
113.  
Brown SP, Westbrook RA, Challagalla G (2005) Good cope, bad cope: Adaptive and maladaptive coping 
strategies following a critical negative work event. J. Appl. Psych. 90(4):792–798.  
Brown T (2011) Red Sox turn Francona into scapegoat. Yahoo! Sports (September 
30) http://sports.yahoo.com/news/red-sox-turn-francona-scapegoat-202000713--mlb.html.  
Brunsson N (1989) The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations (John 
Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK).  
Brunsson N (1993) Ideas and actions: Justification and hypocrisy as alternatives to control. Accounting, 
Organ. Soc. 18(6):489–506.  
Cameron KS (1986) Effectiveness as paradox: Consensus and conflict in conceptions of organizational 
effectiveness. Management Sci. 32(5):539–553.  
Cameron KS, Quinn RE, DeGraff J, Thakor AV (2006) Competing Values Leadership: Creating Value in 
Organizations (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK).  
Carson SJ, Madhok A, Wu T (2006) Uncertainty, opportunism, and governance: The effects of volatility 
and ambiguity on formal and relational contracting. Acad. Management J. 49(5):1058–1077.  
Cha SE, Edmondson AC (2006) When values backfire: Leadership, attribution, and disenchantment in a 
values-driven organization. Leadership Quart. 17(1):57–78.  
Chen M-J (2002) Transcending paradox: The Chinese “middle way” perspective. Asia Pacific J. 
Management 19(2/3):179–199.  
Choo CW (1996) The knowing organization: How organizations use information to construct meaning, 
create knowledge and make decisions. Internat. J. Inform. Management 16(5):329–340.  
Clark JK, Wegener DT, Fabrigar LR (2008) Attitudinal ambivalence and message-based persuasion: 
Motivated processing of proattitudinal information and avoidance of counterattitudinal 
information. Personality Soc. Psych. Bull. 34(4):565–577.  
Clayton V (1982) Wisdom and intelligence: The nature and function of knowledge in the later 
years. Internat. J. Aging Human Development 15(4):315–321.  
Clegg SR, ed. (2002) Management and Organization Paradoxes (John Benjamins, Amsterdam).  
Conner M, Armitage CJ (2008) Attitudinal ambivalence. Crano WD, Prislin R, eds. Attitudes and Attitude 
Change (Psychology Press, New York), 261–288.  
Conner M, Sparks P (2002) Ambivalence and attitudes. Eur. Rev. Soc. Psych. 12:37–70.  
Coser RL (1966) Role distance, sociological ambivalence, and transitional status systems. Amer. J. 
Sociol. 72(2):173–187.  
Cramer P (1998) Coping and defense mechanisms: What’s the difference? J. Personality 66(6):919–946.  
Cramer P (2006) Protecting the Self: Defense Mechanisms in Action (Guilford Press, New York).  
Daft RL, Macintosh NB (1981) A tentative exploration into the amount and equivocality of information 
processing in organizational work units. Admin. Sci. Quart. 26(2):207–224.  
Dane E (2011) Paying attention to mindfulness and its effects on task performance in the workplace. J. 
Management 37(4):997–1018.  
Das TK, Teng B-S (2000) Instabilities of strategic alliances: An internal tensions perspective. Organ. 
Sci. 11(1):77–101.  
Diestel S, Schmidt K-H (2011) Costs of simultaneous coping with emotional dissonance and self-control 
demands at work: Results from two German samples. J. Appl. Psych. 96(3):643–653.  
Eisenberg EM (1984) Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Comm. 
Monogr. 51(3):227–242.  
Elfenbein HA (2007) Emotion in organizations: A review and theoretical integration. Acad. 
Management Ann. 1:315–386.  
Erez A, Misangyi VF, Johnson DE, LePine MA, Halverson KC (2008) Stirring the hearts of followers: 
Charismatic leadership as the transferal of affect. J. Appl. Psych. 93(3):602–615.  
Erikson KT (1976) Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek 
Flood (Touchstone, New York).  
Farjoun M (2010) Beyond dualism: Stability and change as a duality. Acad. Management 
Rev. 35(2):202–225.  
Fassin Y, Buelens M (2011) The hypocrisy-sincerity continuum in corporate communication and 
decision making: A model of corporate social responsibility and business ethics 
practices. Management Decision 49(4):586–600.  
Feeley TH (2002) Comment on halo effects in rating and evaluation research. Human Comm. 
Res. 28(4):578–586.  
Festinger L (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Row, Peterson and Company, Evanston, IL).  
Fiol CM, O’Connor EJ (2003) Waking up! Mindfulness in the face of bandwagons. Acad. Management 
Rev. 28(1):54–70.  
Fiol CM, Pratt MG, O’Connor EJ (2009) Managing intractable identity conflicts. Acad. Management 
Rev. 34(1):32–55.  
Fiss PC, Zajac EJ (2006) The symbolic management of strategic change: Sensegiving via framing and 
decoupling. Acad. Management J. 49(6):1173–1193.  
Fitzgerald FS (1945) The crack-up. Wilson E, ed. The Crack-Up (New Directions, New York), 69–84.  
Folkman S, Lazarus RS (1980) An analysis of coping in a middle-aged community sample. J. Health Soc. 
Behav. 21(3):219–239.  
Fong CT (2006) The effects of emotional ambivalence on creativity. Acad. Management J. 49(5):1016–
1030.  
Fong CT, Tiedens LZ (2002) Dueling experiences and dual ambivalences: Emotional and motivational 
ambivalence of women in high status positions. Motivation Emotion 26(1):105–121.  
Freud S (1950/1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, translated by Strachey J (Liveright, New York).  
Galbraith JR (2009) Designing Matrix Organizations That Actually Work: How IBM, Procter & Gamble, 
and Others Design for Success (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco).  
George JM (1996) Group affective tone. West MA, ed. Handbook of Work Group Psychology (John 
Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK), 77–93.  
Gilbert CG (2006) Change in the presence of residual fit: Can competing frames coexist? Organ. 
Sci. 17(1):150–167.  
Gioia DA, Chittipeddi K (1991) Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation. Strategic 
Management J. 12(6):433–448.  
Gioia DA, Nag R, Corley KG (2012) Visionary ambiguity and strategic change: The virtue of vagueness in 
launching major organizational change. J. Management Inquiry 21(4):364–375.  
Glynn MA (2000) When cymbals become symbols: Conflict over organizational identity within a 
symphony orchestra. Organ. Sci. 11(3):285–298.  
Graetz F, Smith ACT (2008) The role of dualities in arbitrating continuity and change in forms of 
organizing. Internat. J. Management Rev. 10(3):265–280.  
Gray JR (1999) A bias toward short-term thinking in threat-related negative emotional 
states. Personality Soc. Psych. Bull. 25(1):65–75.  
Gutierrez B, Howard-Grenville J, Scully MA (2010) The faithful rise up: Split identification and an 
unlikely change effort. Acad. Management J. 53(4):673–699.  
Hardin CD, Higgins ET (1996) Shared reality: How social verification makes the subjective 
objective. Sorrentino RM, Higgins ET, eds. Handbook of Motivation and Cognition, Vol. 3 
(Guilford, New York), 28–84.  
Harrist S (2006) A phenomenological investigation of the experience of ambivalence. J. 
Phenomenologic. Psych. 37(1):85–114.  
Hass RG, Katz I, Rizzo N, Bailey J, Eisenstadt D (1991) Cross-racial appraisal as related to attitude 
ambivalence and cognitive complexity. Personality Soc. Psych. Bull. 17(1):83–92.  
Hatch MJ (1997) Irony and the social construction of contradiction in the humor of a management 
team. Organ. Sci. 8(3):275–288.  
Heider F (1958) The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (John Wiley & Sons, New York).  
Hillcoat-Nallétamby S, Phillips JE (2011) Sociological ambivalence revisited. Sociology 45(2):202–217.  
Hodson G, Maio GR, Esses VM (2001) The role of attitudinal ambivalence in susceptibility to consensus 
information. Basic Appl. Soc. Psych. 23(3):197–205.  
Hoffman MF, Medlock-Klyukovski A (2004) “Our creator who art in heaven”: Paradox, ritual, and 
cultural transformation. Western J. Comm. 68(4):389–410.  
Horney K (1945) Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neurosis (W. W. Norton, New York).  
Isabella LA (1990) Evolving interpretations as a change unfolds: How managers construe key 
organizational events. Acad. Management J. 33(1):7–41.  
Jonas K, Diehl M, Brömer P (1997) Effects of attitudinal ambivalence on information processing and 
attitude-intention consistency. J. Experiment. Soc. Psych. 33(2):190–210.  
Jubas K, Butterwick S (2008) Hard/soft, formal/informal, work/learning: Tenuous/persistent binaries in 
the knowledge-based society. J. Workplace Learn. 20(7/8):514–525.  
Kantola SJ, Syme GJ, Campbell NA (1984) Cognitive dissonance and energy conservation. J. Appl. 
Psych. 69(3):416–421.  
Katz D, Kahn RL (1978) The Social Psychology of Organizations, 2nd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, New York).  
Katz I, Glass DC (1979) An ambivalence-amplification theory of behavior toward the stigmatized. Austin 
WG, Worchel S, eds. The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Brooks-Cole, Monterey, CA), 
55–70.  
Kessler EH, Bailey JR, eds. (2007) Handbook of Organizational and Managerial Wisdom (Sage, Los 
Angeles).  
Kets de Vries MFR, Miller D (1984) The Neurotic Organization: Diagnosing and Changing 
Counterproductive Styles of Management (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco).  
Klimoski R, Mohammed S (1994) Team mental model: Construct or metaphor? J. 
Management 20(2):403–437.  
Kolb DM (1987) Corporate ombudsman and organization conflict resolution. J. Conflict 
Resolution 31(4):673–691.  
Kosmala K, Herrbach O (2006) The ambivalence of professional identity: On cynicism and jouissance in 
audit firms. Human Relations 59(10):1393–1428.  
Kozlowski SWJ, Klein KJ (2000) A multilevel approach to theory and research in organizations: 
Contextual, temporal, and emergent processes. Klein KJ, Kozlowski SWJ, eds. Multilevel Theory, 
Research, and Methods in Organizations: Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions (Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco), 3–90.  
Kozlowski SWJ, Chao GT, Jensen JM (2009) Building an infrastructure for organizational learning: A 
multilevel approach. Kozlowski SWJ, Salas E, eds. Learning, Training, and Development in 
Organizations (Routledge, New York), 363–403.  
Kreiner GE, Ashforth BE (2004) Evidence toward an expanded model of organizational identification. J. 
Organ. Behav. 25(1):1–27.  
Kriegler RJ (1980) Working for the Company: Work and Control in the Whyalla Shipyard (Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, VIC, Australia).  
Ku G (2008) Learning to de-escalate: The effects of regret in escalation of commitment. Organ. Behav. 
Human Decision Processes 105(2):221–232.  
Kunda G (1992) Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation (Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia).  
Larson GS, Tompkins PK (2005) Ambivalence and resistance: A study of management in a concertive 
control system. Comm. Monogr. 72(1):1–21.  
Lavine H, Thomsen CJ, Zanna MP, Borgida E (1998) On the primacy of affect in the determination of 
attitudes and behavior: The moderating role of affective-cognitive ambivalence. J. Experiment. 
Soc. Psych. 34(4):398–421.  
Lawrence PR, Lorsch JW (1967) Differentiation and integration in complex organizations. Admin. Sci. 
Quart. 12(1):1–47.  
Lazarus RS, Folkman S (1984) Stress, Appraisal, and Coping (Springer, New York).  
Lewin K (1951) Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers, edited by Cartwright 
D (Harper & Brothers, New York).  
Lewis MW (2000) Exploring paradox: Toward a more comprehensive guide. Acad. Management 
Rev. 25(4):760–776.  
Lim B-C, Klein KJ (2006) Team mental models and team performance: A field study of the effects of 
team mental model similarity and accuracy. J. Organ. Behav. 27(4):403–418.  
Lüscher LS, Lewis MW (2008) Organizational change and managerial sensemaking: Working through 
paradox. Acad. Management J. 51(2):221–240.  
Maio GR, Greenland K, Bernard M, Esses VM (2001) Effects of intergroup ambivalence on information 
processing: The role of physiological arousal. Group Processes Intergroup Relations 4(4):355–
372.  
Maitlis S (2005) The social processes of organizational sensemaking. Acad. Management J. 48(1):21–49.  
Maitlis S, Lawrence TB (2007) Triggers and enablers of sensegiving in organizations. Acad. 
Management J. 50(1):57–84.  
Margolis JD, Molinsky A (2008) Navigating the bind of necessary evils: Psychological engagement and 
the production of interpersonally sensitive behavior. Acad. Management J. 51(5):847–872.  
Martin RL (2009) The Opposable Mind: Winning Through Integrative Thinking (Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston).  
Maybury-Lewis D, Almagor U, eds. (1989) The Attraction of Opposites: Thought and Society in the 
Dualistic Mode (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor).  
Medvec VH, Madey SF, Gilovich T (1995) When less is more: Counterfactual thinking and satisfaction 
among Olympic medalists. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 69(4):603–610.  
Merton RK (1976) Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays (Free Press, New York).  
Merton RK, Barber E (1976) Sociological ambivalence. Sociological Ambivalence and Other 
Essays by Merton RK (Free Press, New York), 3–31.  
Meyerson DE (2001) Tempered Radicals: How People Use Difference to Inspire Change at 
Work (Harvard Business School Press, Boston).  
Meyerson DE, Scully MA (1995) Tempered radicalism and the politics of ambivalence and 
change. Organ. Sci. 6(5):585–600.  
Morgeson FP, Hofmann DA (1999) The structure and function of collective constructs: Implications for 
multilevel research and theory development. Acad. Management Rev. 24(2):249–265.  
Neumann R, Strack F (2000) Approach and avoidance: The influence of proprioceptive and 
exteroceptive cues on encoding of affective information. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 79(1):39–48.  
Oglensky BD (2008) The ambivalent dynamics of loyalty in mentorship. Human Relations 61(3):419–
448.  
Pescosolido AT (2002) Emergent leaders as managers of group emotion. Leadership Quart. 13(5):583–
599.  
Peters K, Kashima Y (2007) From social talk to social action: Shaping the social triad with emotion 
sharing. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 93(5):780–797.  
Peters MK, Rothman NB, Northcraft GB (2011) Beyond valence: Effects of group emotional tone on 
group negotiation behaviors and outcomes. Mannix EA, Neale MA, Overbeck JR, eds. Research 
on Managing Groups and Teams, Vol. 14 (Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, UK), 163–185.  
Piderit SK (2000) Rethinking resistance and recognizing ambivalence: A multidimensional view of 
attitudes toward an organizational change. Acad. Management Rev. 25(4):783–794.  
Plambeck N, Weber K (2009) CEO ambivalence and responses to strategic issues. Organ. Sci. 20(6):993–
1010.  
Plambeck N, Weber K (2010) When the glass is half full and half empty: CEOs’ ambivalent 
interpretations of strategic issues. Strategic Management J. 31(7):689–710.  
Pradies C, Pratt MG (2010) Ex uno plures: Toward a conceptualization of group ambivalence. Acad. 
Management Proc. August 2010(1):1–6.  
Pratt MG (2000) The good, the bad, and the ambivalent: Managing identification among Amway 
distributors. Admin. Sci. Quart. 45(3):456–493.  
Pratt MG (2001) Social identity dynamics in modern organizations: An organizational 
psychology/organizational behavior perspective. Hogg MA, Terry DJ, eds. Social Identity 
Processes in Organizatonal Contexts (Psychology Press, Philadelphia), 13–30.  
Pratt MG, Dirks KT (2006) Rebuilding trust and restoring positive relationships: A commitment-based 
view of trust. Dutton JE, Ragins BR, eds. Exploring Positive Relationships at Work: Building a 
Theoretical and Research Foundation (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ), 117–136.  
Pratt MG, Doucet L (2000) Ambivalent feelings in organizational relationships. Fineman S, ed. Emotion 
in Organizations, 2nd ed. (Sage, London), 204–226.  
Pratt MG, Dutton JE (2000) Owning up or opting out: The role of emotions and identities in issue 
ownership. Ashkanasy NM, Härtel CEJ, Zerbe WF, eds. Emotions in the Workplace: Research, 
Theory, and Practice (Quorum, Westport, CT), 103–129.  
Pratt MG, Foreman PO (2000) Classifying managerial responses to multiple organizational 
identities. Acad. Management Rev. 25(1):18–42.  
Pratt MG, Pradies C (2011) Just a good place to visit? Exploring positive responses to psychological 
ambivalence. Cameron KS, Spreitzer GM, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Positive Organizational 
Scholarship (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK), 924–937.  
Pratt MG, Rosa JA (2003) Transforming work-family conflict into commitment in network marketing 
organizations. Acad. Management J. 46(4):395–418.  
Radsma J, Bottorff JL (2009) Counteracting ambivalence: Nurses who smoke and their health 
promotion role with patients who smoke. Res. Nursing Health 32(4):443–452.  
Rahim MA (1985) A strategy for managing conflict in complex organizations. Human 
Relations 38(1):81–89.  
Raisch S, Birkinshaw J (2008) Organizational ambidexterity: Antecedents, outcomes, and moderators. J. 
Management 34(3):375–409.  
Rees L, Rothman NB, Lehavy R, Sanchez-Burks J (2013) The ambivalent mind can be a wise mind: 
Emotional ambivalence increases judgment accuracy. J. Experiment. Soc. Psych. 49(3):360–367.  
Roese NJ (1997) Counterfactual thinking. Psych. Bull. 121(1):133–148.  
Rosen M (1988) You asked for it: Christmas at the bosses’ expense. J. Management Stud. 25(5):463–
480.  
Rothenberg A (1979) The Emerging Goddess: The Creative Process in Art, Science, and Other 
Fields (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).  
Rothman NB, Wiesenfeld BM (2007) The social consequences of expressing emotional ambivalence in 
groups and teams. Mannix EA, Neale MA, Anderson CP, eds. Research on Managing Groups and 
Teams, Vol. 10 (Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, UK), 275–308.  
Rousseau DM, Sitkin SB, Burt RS, Camerer C (1998) Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of 
trust. Acad. Management Rev. 23(3):393–404.  
Rowe WG, Cannella AA Jr, Rankin D, Gorman D (2005) Leader succession and organizational 
performance: Integrating the common-sense, ritual scapegoating, and vicious-circle succession 
theories. Leadership Quart. 16(2):197–219.  
Salancik GR (1977) Commitment and the control of organizational behavior and belief. Staw BM, 
Salancik GR, eds. New Directions in Organizational Behavior (St. Clair Press, Chicago), 1–54.  
Schein EH (2010) Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th ed. (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco).  
Schneider JA (2003) Working with pathological and healthy forms of splitting: A case study. Bull. 
Menninger Clinic 67(1):32–49.  
Schoenewolf G (1990) Emotional contagion: Behavioral induction in individuals and groups. Modern 
Psychoanalysis 15(1):49–61.  
Shapiro SL, Carlson LE (2009) The Art and Science of Mindfulness: Integrating Mindfulness into 
Psychology and the Helping Professions (American Psychological Association, Washington, DC).  
Sheeran P (2002) Intention-behavior relations: A conceptual and empirical review. Eur. Rev. Soc. 
Psych. 12(1):1–36.  
Shore K (1998) Managed care and managed competition: A question of morality. Small RF, Barnhill LR, 
eds. Practicing in the New Mental Health Marketplace: Ethical, Legal, and Moral 
Issues (American Psychological Association, Washington, DC), 67–102.  
Sincoff JB (1990) The psychological characteristics of ambivalent people. Clinical Psych. Rev. 10(1):43–
68.  
Sincoff JB (1992) Ambivalence and defense: Effects of a repressive style on normal adolescents’ and 
young adults’ mixed feelings. J. Abnormal Psych. 101(2):251–256.  
Smelser NJ (1998) The rational and the ambivalent in the social sciences. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 63(1):1–16.  
Smircich L, Morgan G (1982) Leadership: The management of meaning. J. Appl. Behav. Sci. 18(3):257–
273.  
Smith AD, Plowman DA, Duchon D (2010) Everyday sensegiving: A closer look at successful plant 
managers. J. Appl. Behav. Sci. 46(2):220–244.  
Smith KK, Berg DN (1987) Paradoxes of Group Life: Understanding Conflict, Paralysis, and Movement in 
Group Dynamics (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco).  
Smith WK, Lewis MW (2011) Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic equilibrium model of 
organizing. Acad. Management Rev. 36(2):381–403.  
Smith WK, Tushman ML (2005) Managing strategic contradictions: A top management model for 
managing innovation streams. Organ. Sci. 16(5):522–536.  
Sonenshein S (2010) We’re changing—or are we? Untangling the role of progressive, regressive, and 
stability narratives during strategic change implementation. Acad. Management J. 53(3):477–
512.  
Staw BM (1980) Rationality and justification in organizational life. Staw BM, Cummings LL, 
eds. Research in Organizatonal Behavior, Vol. 2 (JAI Press, Greenwich, CT), 45–80.  
Staw BM, Sutton RI (1993) Macro organizational psychology. Murnighan JK, ed. Social Psychology in 
Organizations: Advances in Theory and Research (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ), 350–384.  
Sternberg RJ (1998) A balance theory of wisdom. Rev. General Psych. 2(4):347–365.  
Stigliani I, Ravasi D (2012) Organizing thoughts and connecting brains: Material practices and the 
transition from individual to group-level prospective sensemaking. Acad. Management 
J. 55(5):1232–1259.  
Sykes GM, Matza D (1957) Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency. Amer. Sociol. 
Rev. 22(6):664–670.  
Tang Z, Dickson P, Marino L, Tang J, Powell BC (2010) The value of organizational ambivalence for small 
and medium size enterprises in an uncertain world. British J. Management 21(4):809–828.  
Tetlock PE (1985) Accountability: The neglected social context of judgment and choice. Cummings LL, 
Staw BM, eds. Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 7 (JAI Press, Greenwich, CT), 297–332.  
Thomas KW (1992) Conflict and negotiation processes in organizations. Dunnette MD, Hough LM, 
eds. Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2nd ed., Vol. 3 (Consulting 
Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, CA), 651–717.  
Thompson MM, Holmes JG (1996) Ambivalence in close relationships: Conflicted cognitions as a 
catalyst for change. Sorrentino RM, Higgins ET, eds. Handbook of Motivation and Cognition, Vol. 
3 (Guilford Press, New York), 497–530.  
Tracy SJ (2004) Dialectic, contradiction, or double bind? Analyzing and theorizing employee reactions 
to organizational tension. J. Appl. Comm. Res. 32(2):119–146.  
Vadera AK, Pratt MG (2013) Love, hate, ambivalence, or indifference? A conceptual examination of 
workplace crimes and organizational identification. Organ. Sci. 24(1):172–188.  
van Harreveld F, van der Pligt J, de Liver YN (2009a) The agony of ambivalence and ways to resolve it: 
Introducing the MAID model. Personality Soc. Psych. Rev. 13(1):45–61.  
van Harreveld F, Rutjens BT, Rotteveel M, Nordgren LF, van der Pligt J (2009b) Ambivalence and 
decisional conflict as a cause of psychological discomfort: Feeling tense before jumping off the 
fence. J. Experiment. Soc. Psych. 45(1):167–173.  
Van Kleef GA (2008) Emotion in conflict and negotiation: Introducing the emotions as social 
information (EASI) model. Ashkanasy NM, Cooper CL, eds. Research Companion to Emotion in 
Organizations (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK), 392–404.  
Wang L, Pratt MG (2008) An identity-based view of emotional ambivalence and its management in 
organizations. Ashkanasy NM, Cooper CL, eds. Research Companion to Emotion in 
Organizations (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK), 589–604.  
Wegner DM (1989) White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts: Suppression, Obsession, and the 
Psychology of Mental Control (Viking, New York).  
Weick KE (1979) The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd ed. (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA).  
Weick KE (1995) Sensemaking in Organizations (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA).  
Weick KE (1998) The attitude of wisdom: Ambivalence as the optimal compromise. Srivastva S, 
Cooperrider DL, eds. Organizational Wisdom and Executive Courage (Lexington Press, San 
Francisco), 40–64.  
Weick KE (2002) Puzzles in organizational learning: An exercise in disciplined imagination. British J. 
Management 13(S2):S7–S15.  
Weick KE (2004) Mundane poetics: Searching for wisdom in organization studies. Organ. 
Stud. 25(4):653–668.  
Weick KE, Putnam T (2006) Organizing for mindfulness: Eastern wisdom and Western knowledge. J. 
Management Inquiry 15(3):275–287.  
Weick KE, Sutcliffe KM, Obstfeld D (2005) Organizing and the process of sensemaking. Organ. 
Sci. 16(4):409–421.  
Weigert A, Franks DD (1989) Ambivalence: A touchstone of the modern temper. Frank DD, McCarthy 
ED, eds. The Sociology of Emotions: Original Essays and Research Papers (JAI Press, Greenwich, 
CT), 205–227.  
Wells PA (1988) The paradox of functional dysfunction in a Girl Scout camp: Implications of cultural 
diversity for achieving organizational goals. Jones MO, Moore MD, Snyder RC, eds. Inside 
Organizations: Understanding the Human Dimension (Sage, Newbury Park, CA), 109–117.  
Wexler MN (1993) The negative rite of scapegoating: From the ancient tribe to the modern 
organization. Internat. J. Group Tensions 23(4):293–307.  
Wiley N (1988) The micro-macro problem in social theory. Sociol. Theory 6(2):254–261.  
Wilson TD, Hodges SD (1992) Attitudes as temporary constructions. Martin LL, Tesser A, eds. The 
Construction of Social Judgments (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ), 37–66.  
Wright C (2009) Inside out? Organizational membership, ambiguity and the ambivalent identity of the 
internal consultant. British J. Management 20(3):309–322.  
Ziegler R, Hagen B, Diehl M (2012) Relationship between job satisfaction and job performance: Job 
ambivalence as a moderator. J. Appl. Soc. Psych. 42(8):2019–2040.  
Zorn TE (1995) Bosses and buddies: Constructing and performing simultaneously hierarchical and close 
friendship relationships. Wood JT, Duck S, eds. Under-Studied Relationships: Off the Beaten 
Track (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA), 122–147. 
